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This thesis investigates whether using the low beta-to-ETF measure introduced by Lynch, 
Page, Panariello & Giroux (2019) after high volume ETF selloffs produce investors 
abnormal returns on a short-term and long-term basis. This low beta-to-ETF strategy aims 
to capture the so-called ETF outsider stocks that are unintentionally co-moving with the 
rest of the ETF constituents. The key motivation is that the investors should buy these 
outsiders after a downward price-pressure from a selloff event and then capture the price 
reversion after the situation normalizes. 
 
By applying Lynch et al. (2019) methodology, a set of both U.S. and European broad-
index and factor ETFs are examined for selloff days from 01/2016 to 08/2020. Overall, 
202 outsider ETF constituent portfolios are created, which are then each held for 40 days. 
These portfolios are then combined into long-term systematic strategies for each ETF and 
are backtested for the entirety of the sample period and estimated with the Fama-French 
Five-factor model with betting against beta expansion. Additionally, a fundamental proxy 
component of Piotroski F-Score is suggested to enhance stock-picking for the portfolios, 
as Lynch et al. (2019) discussed the benefits of applying fundamental analysis for their 
strategy. 
 
The results of this thesis indicate that short-term outsider stock strategy for these sample 
ETFs produces an average cumulative abnormal return of 1.3% after a 40-day holding 
period. The long-term systematic strategy fails to generate statistically significant alpha 
estimated by the Fama-French Five-factor model but produces superior Sharpe ratios and 
reduces volatility compared to just passively holding the parent ETFs. Finally, the 
fundamental proxy suggested as an enhancing stock-picking factor does not improve the 
abnormal returns obtained in this thesis. 
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Tämä tutkielma pyrkii selvittämään, voiko Lynch, Page, Panariello & Giroux (2019) 
esiintuomaa sijoitusstrategiaa hyödyntämällä saada epänormaaleja tuottoja. Strategiassa 
sijoitetaan matalan pörssinoteeratun rahaston kautta mitatun betan osakkeisiin sellaisten 
päivien jälkeen, kun pörssinoteerattua rahastoa myydään epätavallisen suurella 
volyymilla, ja rahastolla on samanaikaisesti negatiivinen päivätuotto. Perimmäisenä 
tarkoituksena on vangita sellaisten osakkeitten tuottokäänne, jotka ovat liikkuneet alas 
rahaston mukana. 
 
Käyttämällä Lynch ym. (2019) menetelmiä, ja valitsemalla tutkimukseen USA- sekä 
Eurooppa pörssinoteerattuja indeksirahastoja sekä faktorirahastoja aikavälillä 01/2016 – 
08/2020, yhteensä 202 matalan betan portfoliota saadaan luotua. Jokaista portfoliota 
pidetään 40 päivää, ennen myymistä. Tämän lyhyen ajan strategian tuloksen yhdistetään 
sen jälkeen yhdeksi pitkäksi strategiaksi jokaiselle rahastolle erikseen. Tämän pitkänajan 
strategian tuottoja arvioidaan Fama-French viiden faktorin mallilla ja Betting Against 
Beta lisäkomponentilla. Vielä lopuksi, portfoliot painotetaan tässä tutkielmassa 
ehdotetulla Piotroskin F-Score fundamenttikomponentilla, jonka tarkoitus on auttaa 
osakepoiminnassa portfolioiden luontivaiheessa. 
 
Tämän tutkielman tulokset osoittavat, että lyhyen ajan matalan rahaston kautta mitatun 
betan osakepoimintastrategian epänormaalit tuotot kumuloituvat 1.30% asti, 40 päivän 
jälkeen. Pitkän aikavälin strategia ei tuota tilastollisesti merkittäviä epänormaaleja 
tuottoja yhdellekään rahastolle, mutta tehostaa tuottoja Sharpen luvulla mitattuna. 
Lopulta, fundamenttikomponentilla painotetut portfoliot eivät myöskään tuota oleellisesti 
suurempia epänormaaleja tuottoja. 
______________________________________________________________________  
 








The popularity of passive investing has expanded significantly over the recent years, as 
passive index fund assets exceeded $10 trillion in 2020, and the trend is set to continue 
(Financial Times 2020). Similarly, Moody’s estimated that the passive index funds will 
acquire over 50% share of total fund assets latest by 2024 (Reuters 2017). The preference 
of passive investing over active has ensured its increasing popularity from the lower costs, 
simplicity, and better long-run performance compared to active management (French 
2008). 
 
Especially the novel product of Exchange-Traded funds (ETFs) has gathered mainstream 
popularity among investors, as the total share of ETFs of the passive fund assets already 
surpassed 40% in 2017 (Reuters 2017). The continuous innovation and decreasing fund 
costs of ETFs have ensured that active management and traditional mutual funds keep 
losing market share. Morningstar’s (2019a) annual fund fee study found out that the 
average passive fund expense ratio was just 0.15% compared to actively managed funds’ 
0.67%. This means that the average active fund investor pays 4.5 times the expenses 
compared to the passive investor, which are most often not backed with superior returns. 
 
However, recent studies have shown increased concern on the effects of passive investing 
to the security level price discovery. Several studies have investigated the relationship 
between indexing and stock correlations and co-movements (Agarwal, Hanouna, 
Moussawi, Stahel 2018; Barberis, Shleifer & Wurgler 2005; Coles, Heath & Ringgenberg 
2020; Glosten, Nallareddy & Zou 2016). The studies have suggested that the indexing 
tends to increase the constituent stock correlations, commonality in stock liquidity, and 
reduced information production. These findings open several new questions about the 
performance of individual stocks when the fundamental aspect of price-discovery might 
further decrease when index-linked investing becomes more common. 
 
Furthermore, if investor limits their investment portfolio to passive index-following, it is 
impossible to beat the market as one captures only the followed market return, minus fund 
expenses. Naturally, not everyone can beat the market, and as Sharpe (1991) stated, 
financial markets are practically a zero-sum game. If there are winning managers, there 
must be losing managers, too. New, more dynamic ETF strategies have emerged to 
capture the gap between active and passive strategies. Smart-beta and strategic-beta ETFs 
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invest and diversify by different market risk factors found by academia while still beating 
active funds with lower fees (iShares 2020a). 
 
This thesis is inspired to challenge the megatrend of passive investing by showing that 
using the active investment strategy suggested by Lynch et al. (2019) that exploits the 
ETF constituent co-movements by measuring the constituent stock betas against their 
parent ETFs and then investing to the lowest-beta or so-called, outsider stocks can yield 
investors abnormal returns. As previous studies on the subject of ETF constituent 
correlations inspect either a predetermined sample of sector SPDR (Standard & Poor’s 
Depository Receipt) funds (Lynch et al. 2019) or a wide cross-section of ETFs (Da & 
Shive, 2018), this paper investigates the usefulness of similar strategies in a sample of 
popular broad-index, and factor ETFs. Motivation is to show further that active investing 
has its place in the mix of market participation and advance discussion about the 
suggested negative aspects of the ongoing trend of excessive passive investing. 
 
 
1.1. Purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether the investment strategy proposed by 
Lynch et al. (2019) is still applicable and that exploiting the strategy provides abnormal 
returns. The sample in this paper tries to bring fresh insight compared to the U.S. broad-
market and sector-focused funds that were investigated in the original study by selecting 
U.S. and European-based broad-index and factor ETFs for inspection. The factor ETFs 
include quality factor weighting and various ESG factor funds (Environmental, Social, 
and Governance). 
 
This thesis contributes to the earlier literature by two key aspects. First, as Lynch et al. 
(2019) measure the short-term average cumulative abnormal returns by forming equal-
weighted portfolios, these portfolios are expanded to value-weighted and fundamentally 
weighted alternatives in this thesis. The value-weighting is measured by each 
constituent’s proportional holding weight in their parent ETFs. The motivation of value-
weighting is based on the presumption that stocks with higher ETF ownership tend to 
experience more volatility during demand shocks (Ben-David, Franzoni & Moussawi 
2018). This finding is not directly applied to this thesis, but instead used as a basis for 





Moreover, the fundamental weights are calculated from each constituent’s fundamental 
rating proxied by Piotroski (2000) F-Score. Using fundamental weighting aims to solve 
the issue Lynch et al. (2019) discussed, where the lack of discretionary stock level 
analysis in the portfolio creation phase can limit the overall returns of the strategy. 
 
Secondly, as Lynch et al. (2019) do not evaluate the systematic long-term performance 
of the low beta-to-ETF strategy in their paper, this thesis aims to backtest the strategy and 
investigate whether it can produce abnormal returns or better risk-adjusted returns for the 
investors on a long-term basis. The Fama-French Five-factor model is used to estimate 
the abnormal returns, and the risk-adjusted returns are measured with the Sharpe Ratio.   
 
As the previous research discussing the ETF mispricings and ETF constituent co-
movements has found that ETF constituent correlations are significant (Da & Shive 2018) 
and systematic strategies can be formed to capture abnormal returns from this 
informational inefficiency (Lynch et al. 2019), it is expected that similarly significant 
results can be obtained with the unique sample selected in this thesis. The studies 
mentioned earlier and in the literary review section are used as the main inspiration and 
motivator for this paper. Especially methods from Lynch et al. (2019) are utilized to 
capture a possible time-structure for the abnormal return after ETF selloff dates. 
 
Inspired by Lynch et al. (2019), all the selected ETFs will be observed for any significant 
trading volume increases combined with negative ETF return for the same day. These 
captured days are treated as the ETF selloff days. A contrarian trading strategy is then 
utilized, where the ETF constituent stock sensitivities are measured against the parent 
ETF, creating each constituent a beta-to-ETF. From these betas, the decile of lowest 
betas-to-ETF form an outsider portfolio that is expected to outperform the ETF, by the 
theory that the outsider stocks are being unintentionally dragged down during selloffs 
with the rest of the fund and will rebound after the trading normalizes from the selloff 
day. 
 
The fund selection in this thesis focuses mainly on singular region-based iShares ETFs. 
As for the outsider portfolio forming, comprehensive historical fund holding data is 
needed, which practically excluded most of the other fund providers apart from iShares, 
as their historical fund holding data is exhaustive compared to others. Thus, most of the 
funds used in this paper are either Europe or U.S.-based ETFs with a region or 
fundamental based strategy. This restriction is first to ensure comparability with the 
original (Lynch et al., 2019) study in which the authors used only U.S. broad-index and 
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sector SPDRs, and secondly to minimize portfolio creation and price staleness issues with 
different time-zones and market holidays, as the portfolio holding periods are relatively 
short. 
 
The European fund selection mixed with U.S.-based funds provides a great updated cross-
sectional look of the usability of the strategy perceived by Lynch et al. (2019) as 
especially systematic anomalies in the financial markets tend to disappear rapidly or are 
excessively challenging to reproduce (Hou, Xue & Zhang 2020). Additionally, this thesis 
provides much-needed contrast to ETF based studies since most of the research involving 
the topic are either from U.S. or Asian markets, even though the European ETF mass has 
grown almost 40% from the 2016 and is projected to hit $2 trillion in 2024 (ETFStream 
2020). 
 
However, as the U.S.-based factor ETFs and European ESG ETFs are not entirely 
comparable to the U.S. sector-based ETFs and broad-index funds used by Lynch et al. 
(2019), results might be unpredictable. In their paper, the authors investigated mainly 
sector-based SPRDs, SPY, the largest S&P 500 broad-index fund globally, and IJR, the 
S&P 500 small-cap ETF. Thus, this thesis is motivated to pursue whether the effects for 
the broad-index ETFs can be replicated in a wider, more diverse context and further 
applied to factor ETFs to prove the usability of the beta-to-ETF component as a 
convenient investment metric for contrarian investors to benefit from the continuously 
occurring selloff events. 
 
 
1.2. Research Hypotheses 
 
This thesis is motivated to investigate a total of three hypotheses. The first one is the main 
hypothesis of the thesis, and the second and the third are more auxiliary and tend to derive 
results from the findings of the main hypothesis. The first hypothesis of this thesis can be 
considered the base of this thesis, and it continues on the findings Lynch et al. (2019) 
captured in their paper. The first hypothesis is the following: 
 
H1: The low beta-to-ETF stocks generate statistically significant abnormal returns after 
high volume ETF selloffs. 
 
While being auxiliary to the main hypothesis, the second hypothesis in this thesis provides 
insight into the lack of systematic backtesting provided for the low beta-to-ETF strategy 
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in the original (Lynch et al. 2019) paper. As the existence and size of the opportunity is 
captured, it is furthermore important to investigate whether the strategy proves its 
usefulness by the traditional portfolio evaluation metrics. In this thesis, the short-term 
portfolios are transformed into one long time-series of returns that examines whether 
systematically investing with the low beta-to-ETF selloff portfolio rule would generate 
abnormal returns in the long-term. Thus, the second hypothesis is stated as follows: 
 
H2: The low beta-to-ETF strategy generates statistically significant abnormal returns as 
a long-term systematic strategy. 
 
Finally, the third and the last hypothesis presented in this thesis contributes towards 
solving the issue Lynch et al. (2019) mentioned in their paper, relating to the fundamental 
analysis in the portfolio creation process. As the ETF selloffs tend to push all the stocks 
in the ETF downwards, there should be stocks where this is not fundamentally warranted 
and is just overreacting with the rest of the index. Thus, in this paper, a discrete financial 
ratio of Piotroski F-Score (Piotroski 2000) is used as a fundamental proxy to investigate 
whether sorting outsider stocks by their fundamental attributes enhances the bounce-back 
effect of the outsider stocks: 
 
H3: The fundamental weighting provides better, statistically significant abnormal returns 
for low beta-to-ETF portfolios after high volume ETF selloffs.  
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
In this chapter, the main characteristics of passive investing and the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis are explained. Additionally, ETFs’ key features and details about stock 
correlation and co-movement are introduced, as highly correlating assets without a 
fundamental basis can provide active investors possibilities to exploit this connection and 
predict future returns. Finally, methods and metrics to evaluate portfolio performance in 
the context of this thesis are briefly visited. 
 
 
2.1. Passive investing 
 
Passive investing has achieved an unquestionable megatrend status over the past decades. 
In the financial markets, capital has been moving towards passive, index-linked 
investments at an increasing rate. In the fall of 2019, assets allocated in index-linked U.S.  
equity funds overtook active U.S.-equity funds the first time in history (Bloomberg 
2019a), as seen in Graph 1. The low costs of index tracking and continuous financial 
innovation, especially with exchange-traded products (ETPs), have accelerated the shift 











Jan-19 Feb-19 Mar-19 Apr-19 May-19 Jun-19 Jul-19 Aug-19
U.S. Equity Funds Active vs. Passive 
Active Stock Funds Passive Stock Funds
Graph 1. Active U.S. Equity funds versus Passive Equity Funds in Trillions of USD (Morningstar 2019b). 
17 
 
Overall, the trend of passive versus active assets has been developing towards passive 
biased a long time. As seen in Graph 2, from the year 2008 onwards, the amount of passive 
equity fund assets has been catching up with the amount of active equity fund assets and 
overtook them in August 2019, as mentioned.  
 
 
Similarly, the equity fund flows tell the same story, as the actively managed equity funds 
have been experiencing consistent outflows from 2007 onwards. On the other hand, 
passive funds have experienced almost the reverse and gained significant inflows from 












1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019
U.S. Equity Funds Active Assets vs. Passive Assets








2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
U.S. Equity Fund Flows
Active Passive
Graph 2. U.S. Equity Funds Active Assets versus Passive Assets in Trillions of USD (Morningstar 2019b). 
Graph 3. U.S. Equity Fund Flows in Billions of USD (Morningstar 2019b). 
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Theory and literature support this paradigm change. As Sharpe (1991) states, including 
costs in the equation, actively managed returns will be lower than passively managed ones 
in the long run. French (2008) instead explains that active investing is a negative-sum 
game. The passive market portfolio outperforms the aggregate of the active portfolios 
over time. As active investing seems unjustified by a purely mathematical and logical 
perspective, finding active investing entirely rational becomes more difficult.  
 
However, some critique for increasing passive investing has recently surfaced, as it is 
argued that the price-discovery of equities has decreased by this increase in popularity. 
As the passive investing takes no standpoint in the valuation of the individual assets in 
the index, but the overall development of the followed market segment, it is possible that 
some constituents in indexes can co-move without reasonable fundamental reason (Lynch 
et al. 2019). Moreover, as even the small illiquid stocks in broad indexes are linked to 
trillions of dollars in indexed assets can further complicate the valuations for index 
constituents (Bloomberg 2019b).  
 
The increasing popularity of passive and index-linked investing has created additional 
effects to the stock-index dynamic. Index inclusion or exclusion effect occurs when a 
stock passes the thresholds to be included in or excluded from an index. Petajisto (2011) 
shows that S&P 500 new additions have experienced an average +9% increase in price 
just around the inclusion event. Similarly, in the event of exclusion, the deleted stocks’ 
prices have suffered as much as -15%. Additionally, when new stock is included in an 
index, it starts to move more closely with the other index constituents and less with the 
rest of the market. 
 
Sharpe (1991) divides the stock market participants into active and passive investors. As 
the active investors deviate from the market index weights, passive investors settle for 
holding the market index. However, by combining all the active investors’ holdings, they 
jointly hold the same whole market index as the passive investors. Conversely, the passive 
group receives the market return just by holding the index. This leads logically to the 
situation where active investing in aggregate loses to the passive investing by the 
transaction costs induced by their activity. 
 
Heje Pedersen (2018) argues that the equation between active and passive investors is not 
as straightforward as Sharpe (1991) introduced. As Heje Pedersen (2018) suggests, even 
if the market portfolio or index is usually seen as constant, numerous company additions 
and deletions happen continuously. As the market portfolio changes over time, even 
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passive investors must regularly trade. Additionally, a hypothetical situation where 
everyone is investing passively would not work, as the market portfolio additions such 
as, initial public offerings, would be ultimately mispriced as no one would analyze the 
new company fundamentals. Eventually, anyone could list a company at any price, as the 
passive investors would be required to take it as a part of the market portfolio. 
 
Finally, Coles et al. (2020) state that passive investors are somewhat freeriding the 
groundwork made by active investors by the form of fundamental analysis. Markets 
would not operate properly if everyone shifted to passive investing, as there must be 
active managers analyzing company fundamentals and making active investment 
decisions to buy undervalued and sell overvalued companies. In the context of this paper, 
to capture the effects of passive investing and co-movement in stock markets, ETFs are 
used as a convenient proxy.  
 
 
2.2. The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
Fama (1970) introduced the novel approach to inspect the functioning of the financial 
markets and security prices. As previously introduced, the EMH suggests that during any 
given moment, the market prices of securities must reflect all available information. The 
basis of the financial market is that it provides a platform for people to trade securities to 
each other to create wealth for themselves. In the markets, rational investors buy and sell 
securities by justifying their trades by their own expectations of the future price 
development of the security. The EMH essentially introduces a situation where the 
traders’ profits are not necessarily dependent on their skill, but just coincidence. 
 
Furthermore, the EMH explains the question of whether the security prices in the market 
reflect their true underlying fundamental values. As the EMH suggests, security prices 
move continuously and only when new fundamental information about a security is 
introduced. To illustrate the sentiment behind the EMH, a situation where traders become 
pessimistic about a stock when there has not been any new negative fundamental 
information would be immediately countered by optimistic rational investors to return to 
the equilibrium. However, if the negative sentiment was warranted by negative 
fundamental news, the stock price would decrease enough to gain a new equilibrium that 




The EMH is often divided into three different subsets of information requirements, 
relating to market efficiency conditions. Firstly, the weak form of market efficiency states 
that security prices cannot be forecasted from past, historical information. In other words, 
any technical analysis of the historical stock prices should not yield a profit to investors. 
With technical analysis, investors study the historical security prices to predict the future 
development of the prices. As the conditions made by the weak form of EMH are 
relatively easy to test empirically, a significant amount of research has been made on the 
topic. (Burton, Shah & Shah 2013). 
 
Secondly, the semi-strong version of the EMH suggests that security prices cannot be 
forecasted by using historical prices or any public fundamental information. Essentially, 
the semi-strong form implicates that active portfolio management should not provide 
superior returns in comparison to passive management. Previous research supports this, 
as the average equity portfolios underperform the average passive portfolios over a long 
period of time (Fama & French 2010). As the semi-strong form of EMH states, 
individuals have no superior means to gather information, as it is all publicly available, 
and any restrictions such as financial or positional, do not exist. 
 
Finally, the strong form of EMH demonstrates a hypothetical situation where the security 
prices reflect all information, including private and public, all the time. In principle, the 
strong form means that even the silent information that has not been released to the public 
is already incorporated to the market prices of securities. The strong form of EMH is the 
least supported of the three subsets, but it provides a framework for further discussion. 
Especially, the effect of insider trading should be captured in the market prices if the 
strong form of EMH was true. (Burton et al. 2013). 
 
Overall, the semi-strong form of EMH is usually the most supported subset (Bodie, Kane 
& Marcus 2009). However, as the core concept of the EMH is to explain price functions 
in the financial market, naturally, opposing research exists. Starting from the weak form 
of the EMH, studies have unveiled effects and price patterns that suggest return 
predictability in stock prices. Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) introduce an investment 
strategy called momentum, which provides returns by buying past winners and selling 
past losers in the market. In other words, securities that have fared poorly recently are 
being shorted and securities that have fared well are being bought. As the weak form of 
EMH states that the historical prices should not forecast future returns, the effects of 
momentum strategy are significant. Additionally, Bondt & Thaler (1985) show short-term 
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overreaction in the recent winners and recent losers’ returns. This effect is more 
commonly known as the contrarian investment strategy.  
 
This momentum and contrarian anomalies are exceptions to the weak form subset of the 
EMH. For the semi-strong subset of EMH, other significant anomalies have been studied. 
For instance, value stocks that are companies with high book-to-market ratios, 
systematically produce superior returns compared to other stocks (Lakonishok, Shleifer 
and Vishny 1994). Post-earnings announcement drift where the security prices continue 
increasing after positive earnings announcements is a situation where the information 
unveiled from the earnings announcement is not fully incorporated into the stock price 
immediately after the announcement (Bernard & Thomas 1990). 
 
Furthermore, recent additional ways of thinking to oppose the EMH have lately emerged. 
Pedersen (2015), for example describes the financial markets as efficiently inefficient. 
This idea combines the observed market efficiency with the studied inefficiencies. 
Financial markets are perceived as nearly efficient with this school of thought due to high 
competition, but inefficient enough because of financial anomalies and investor 
behavioral biases. This market inefficiency allows skilled active portfolio managers to 
create wealth and showcase that operating in the markets is not just a game of chance. 
 
To conclude, there are exceptions to both weak and semi-strong forms of EMH. As the 
EMH intends to prove that markets are efficient, it is problematic to hypothesize that the 
number of exceptions to the general rule is significant. Recent studies have introduced an 
additional viewpoint to market efficiency by combining efficient and inefficient markets 
(Pedersen 2015). Moreover, other factors negatively affect the applying of the EMH than 
just anomalies, as the EMH is built on the supposition of functioning arbitrage that will 
be next discussed further. 
 
2.2.1. Arbitrage and limits to arbitrage 
 
As this chapter thus far has explained the concept of the EMH, it is necessary to introduce 
the underlying process called arbitrage, that is behind the EMH. By the textbook, 
definition arbitrage is a simultaneous process of buying and selling a security, which 
captures a riskless profit. Theoretically, arbitrage does not require any capital as the 
arbitrageur conducts the buying and selling at the same time and secures the profit 
immediately. As a theorem, arbitrage is a simple concept, but it is difficult to reproduce 




As the basis of the EMH is that security prices in the market must continuously reflect all 
the available fundamental information, there must be a process that ensures that the 
security prices do not deviate from their fundamental values. The arbitrage prevents these 
price deviations. To demonstrate, if the price of one security does not represent its 
fundamental value, arbitrageurs should immediately buy or sell the security until the price 
equilibrium is obtained. In theory, the process sounds relatively simple, but several limits 
are perceived in this process in practice. 
 
The critical problem with arbitrage is that by the textbook definition, it should be riskless. 
The perceived riskiness results in a situation where arbitrageurs hesitate to correct 
mispricing since the riskiness increases costs, and any costs to the arbitrage process would 
defeat its textbook purpose. Shleifer & Vishny (1997) show that in the real world, the 
possibility of forced liquidation before the security price converts back to its equilibrium 
creates a significant risk to the arbitrageurs since the resources are finite. Additionally, as 
the textbook arbitrage requires a simultaneous purchase and sale of a security, short 
selling must be available for the security. This is often not possible, and even when a short 
sale can be implemented, there are additional costs to this process (Barberis & Thaler 
2002). 
 
As the textbook arbitrage has been shown by studies to be both risky and costly, it is 
necessary to investigate what magnitude can it be implemented in real-life situations. 
Froot & Dabora (1999) inspect two dual-listed companies and compare their market 
prices to each other. These companies, Royal Dutch and Shell Transport, are independent 
companies that have merged their cash flows by a 60:40 ratio by agreement. This creates 
a situation where the Royal Dutch stock price should always be 1.5 times the price of the 
Shell Transport stock as these companies merge their cash flows in a predetermined 
manner. 
 
Results of Froot & Dabora (1999) paper indicate that the relative pricing between the two 
stocks was significantly inefficient. For example, during the inspection period, the Royal 
Dutch stock price was as much as 35% underpriced, and sometimes over 15% overpriced. 
If the arbitrage in this situation would be riskless and costless, it should be simple to buy 
Royal Dutch when it is underpriced and short it later when it is overpriced. The difficulty 
here stems from the fact that these price deviations from the equilibrium last increasingly 
long periods when the risk of finite capital and early forced liquidation is nonzero 
(Barberis & Thaler 2002). 
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These limits of arbitrage create additional problems in financial bubbles. As the EMH 
suggests that the prices should converge to their fundamental values, the extended price 
deviations raise the problem of whether the arbitrage works in real life quickly enough. 
As  Froot & Dabora (1999) investigate the Royal Dutch and Shell Transport, the relative 
price between the stocks converged to equilibrium in roughly 2002, when the inspection 
period started in 1980. The issue is whether the arbitrage process is efficient enough when 
eliminating this arbitrage opportunity took over 20 years or is there significant limits to 
this process, such as Shleifer & Vishny (1997) have suggested. 
 
Consequently, even if the arbitrage was riskless, purchases and shorts were entirely 
costless, and there were no taxes to pay from the riskless profit, the final limit to arbitrage 
comes from the uncertainty that the financial model used to capture the fundamental value 
of the stock, is wrong. This model risk creates an additional issue that the model used 
indicates arbitrage opportunity, even when the market price is fundamentally correct. 
Being familiar with the EMH and arbitrage is crucial for understanding the underlying 
processes behind ETFs that will be introduced next.  
 
 
2.3. ETF characteristics 
 
An ETF can be explained as an investment vehicle that projects their pre-determined 
underlying basket of securities. ETFs function very similarly to mutual funds, but 
dissimilarities do also exist. The critical difference between an ETF and a mutual fund is 
that the ETF can be traded on the secondary markets. This is advantageous, as mutual 
fund investors who intend to cash out their positions must wait for the end of the day as 
the fund’s net asset value (NAV) is calculated only once in the day (Greene, Hodges & 
Rakowski 2007). For ETF investors, such restrictions do not apply, and investors can 
freely trade their fund positions with other investors when the market is open. Price 
discovery for ETFs is thus a factor between the fund’s NAV and its market price. For 
mutual funds and ETFs, NAV works similarly and describes the fund market value per 
share at a specific point in time. NAV can be calculated by dividing the fund’s total assets 
minus liabilities by shares outstanding. NAV is based on the closing prices of the 
underlying securities. 
 
In 1993 the first ETF, S&P Depositary Receipt (SPDR), was issued. As SPDR allowed 
the investors to invest in the S&P 500 index's contents with a single trade, invention soon 
gained more popularity. As the total number of ETFs worldwide was just over 200 in the 
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year 2001, the number of different funds has soared to over 6,500 funds in 2019. 




Furthermore, ETFs beat the traditional mutual funds at the fund expense ratios. Overall, 
decreasing fund expenses continues, illustrated by Morningstar's study (Pionline 2019), 
wherein 2018, the cheapest 20% of the funds saw larger net inflows than the remaining 
80% together. The average ETF expense ratio was just 0.23% in 2016, and for 
comparison, the expense ratio for index-based mutual funds was 0.73% and 1.45% for 
actively managed mutual funds. As the mutual fund load, or the broker’s commission, is 
absent in ETFs, expense ratios fall in favor of them. However, as the ETFs are traded in 
the secondary markets, there are additional commissions and transaction costs in ETF 
trading (Fidelity 2011). 
 
As ETF products have become more and more popular, the supply of different fund styles 
has increased significantly. Especially factor investing with ETFs has gained popularity 
during recent years. As education about the benefits of passive investing increases, factor 
investing has become a useful intermediate between passive and active investing. Recent 
ETFs are attempting to capture the returns of fundamental factors observed by academia, 








2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Number of ETFs ETF assets $ Bn
Graph 4. Total number of ETFs and ETF assets worldwide. 
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As most of the other fundamental factors are well researched, ESG is a relatively new 
branch of categorization. As sustainable investing increases its popularity, naturally, new 
financial innovations and resources originate to satisfy the investor interest. UBS 
Research (2019) found out that the amount of completely ESG denialist asset owners 
have shrunk to just 5% in their 600 owner, $21 trillion asset sample. In the theme of the 
mentioned increase of passive investing, ESG ETFs have similarly gained a foothold in 
the financial industry. From the year 2016, the assets invested in the ESG ETF universe 
has expanded by over 400% to over 52 billion dollars (Nasdaq 2019). The rapid expansion 
of these thematical funds offers excellent motivation for including a sample of these funds 
in this paper. 
 
2.3.1. ETF Creation-Redemption process 
 
Behind every ETF product, the Creation-Redemption process illustrates the process 
happening in the primary market. This process involves several parties, from which the 
most important is the Authorized Participant (AP). AP’s responsibility is to keep the 
ETF’s market price as close to the ETF NAV as possible. However, due to this pricing 
mechanism’s balancing nature, arbitrage opportunities in the ETF pricing appear. Large 
volumes and market fluctuations in the ETF supply and demand tend to make the ETF 
prices diverge from its NAV, which creates an arbitrage opportunity for AP to exploit 
(Ferri & Phillips 2009; Gastineau 2010). This continuous process creates constant 
additional price pressure for stocks that are included in any high-flow ETF. Thus, 
understanding the key process behind the ETF induced market activity is necessary for 
any study involving these financial instruments.  
 
The creation process of a traditional open-ended stock ETF would be as follows. First, an 
ETF provider decides the ETF contents and benchmark index it follows and contacts an 
AP. The AP then acquires the necessary securities from the market by the replicated index 
weights. Finally, the AP delivers these securities to the ETF provider, and in exchange, 
the provider delivers the AP an ETF creation unit that represents blocks of equal value 
ETF shares. Usually, a creation unit consists of 50 000 to 250 000 individual ETF shares. 
The exchange happens on a fair-value basis, as the delivered underlying shares represent 






This process can be reversed and works as ETF share redemption. Here the AP can 
remove ETF shares from the market by submitting a full creation unit to the ETF provider. 
ETF provider in exchange gives AP the same value in original ETF underlying securities, 
in kind.  
 
The ETF creation-redemption process and its effects on ETF constituents and ETF price 
efficiency has been studied widely. (Da & Shive, 2018) investigate the effects of ETF 
arbitrage activity to its underlying portfolio of securities and find that the arbitrage 
activity can transfer the non-fundamental shocks forward to the constituents and thus, 
increase co-movement between stocks. Additionally, (Petajisto 2017) finds economically 
significant mispricing between ETF market prices and their NAVs and creates a 
systematic trading strategy to exploit this effect.  
 
2.3.2. The ETF arbitrage mechanism 
 
As an AP’s role is to keep the ETF market price matching its NAV, the question of 
whether the current ETF market price is over, under, or strictly at its NAV arises. As ETF 
creation-redemption process allows APs to create or redeem ETF shares constantly, the 
discrepancies between ETF market price and its NAV tend to be mostly moderate. Even 
though the creation-redemption ensures the relative efficiency of ETF market prices, it 
does not guarantee absolute efficiency between market price and the NAV. The ETF 
market price deviation from its NAV can be stated as the ETF premium or discount. 
Figure 1. The ETF Creation-Redemption Process illustrated (Investment Company Institute 2020). 
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Meaning ETF trades at a premium if its market value is over its NAV and vice versa. 
(Ferri & Phillips 2009) In short, ETF creation-redemption is an arbitrage process 
conducted by APs to balance between ETF’s NAV and market price. 
 
As the markets can be considered semi-efficient by EMH, premium or discount in ETF 
prices should not be possible for extended periods or by great magnitude, as the 
arbitrageurs would immediately eliminate these opportunities from the markets. To 
capture the riskless profit, an arbitrageur could create overvalued (premium) ETFs by 
purchasing the underlying basket of securities from the market and creating the ETF unit. 
Currently, this process is controlled by APs, which capture the small arbitrage profits 
from the market. The competition between APs has been said to control the arbitrage 
profits, but recent studies have suggested that even with APs controlling the arbitrage, 
there are economically significant mispricing in some ETF classes that could be exploited 
by active trading strategies. (Petajisto 2017). 
 
Moreover, even though the ETF pricing mechanism contains an arbitrage process, there 
can be additional limits to arbitrage. As (Shleifer & Vishny 1997) note, true arbitrage 
should not require any starting capital and contain any risk. This is often not the case in 
the real-world, and authors further discover that arbitrageurs tend to avoid more volatile 
positions that increase the fundamental risk. Additionally, arbitrage opportunities can 
often be appropriately exploited only by a handful of sophisticated investors; thus it is not 
an all market-wide phenomenon. As the real-life arbitrage is risky, it is debatable whether 
the relative value bets can be considered true arbitrage.  
 
As the co-movement between the ETF constituent stocks is one of the key interests in this 
paper, it is necessary to briefly inspect the different replication methods for ETFs. In 
short, three main categories of ETF replication can be differentiated. The first method, 
the Physical, or full replication is the most theoretically simple. The underlying index is 
fully replicated by acquiring securities from the market by the exact index weights. 
Restrictions to the full replication method come mainly from possible rounding errors 
from fractional index weights for individual stocks. (Lyxor 2019). 
 
The second method, the Sampling method, is often used when the replicated index 
consists of a large variety of different markets or illiquid securities. In these instances, 
full physical replication would be too expensive. In the sampling method, replication is 
optimized by quantitative models so that only the most liquid stocks are used for the 
replication, and thus transaction costs are minimized. In other words, instead of fully 
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replicating the index, only a representative subsample is needed that still delivers similar 
returns to the actual index. (Lyxor 2019). 
 
The third method, Synthetic replication, uses derivatives to replicate the index. More 
specifically, a total return swap that delivers the index return. For the trade, ETF holds 
liquid securities and delivers the basket's profit to the swap counterparty. The Synthetic 
method can often replicate certain indexes such as commodities and money markets more 
efficiently than through the Physical or Sampling methods. However, when using 
derivatives, the risk that the swap deal’s counterparty might go bankrupt and thus fail to 
deliver the return increases. This risk is called the counterparty risk.  (ESRB 2019; Lyxor 
2019)  
 
To compare the efficiency of ETF replication methods between each other, a useful 
measure of tracking error is introduced. Tracking error reflects the discrepancy between 
the ETF NAV return and the return of its underlying index. The chosen replication method 
naturally affects tracking error. In theory, full physical replication should provide NAV 
return of zero to minimal error, compared to the sampling method that optimizes the 
holdings, thus not reflecting the underlying index perfectly but near enough to provide a 
similar return. 
 
Piccotti (2018) measures the NAV tracking error as the standard deviation of the daily 
NAV return minus the underlying index’s return. The tracking error of ETF j in the time 
t can be stated as follows: 
 
(1) 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑗,𝑡 =  (𝑟𝑗,𝑡
𝑁𝐴𝑉 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑡




𝑁𝐴𝑉 = The daily arithmetic NAV return. 
 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 = The daily arithmetic return of the underlying index. 
 
Following this, the standard deviation for the obtained tracking error is calculated to 
obtain a comparable measurement of the relative deviation of the ETF return and index 
return. Furthermore, as the replication method has an impact on the ETF tracking error, 
Piccotti (2018) suggested that more segmented markets with higher entry barriers and 
higher illiquidity affect the ETF’s ability to track its underlying index. Thus, region-based 
ETFs on emerging or frontier markets often suffer from higher tracking errors, similar to 
regional funds in more developed markets. 
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As the market segmentation is one factor for tracking errors, index constituent illiquidity 
has been suggested by several authors to be a magnifying factor for tracking error 
(Loviscek, Tang & Xu 2014; Ferri & Phillips 2009; Piccotti 2018). However, the market 
illiquidity is often a consequence of the segmentation in the target markets, in the form 
of increased trading costs or limited market depth. 
 
For the replication methods, the synthetic replication ensures the smallest tracking error 
of the three. As trading frictions such as liquidity, bid-ask spread, and the optimization in 
sampling method all magnify the tracking error, the same return is guaranteed by the 
counterparty in synthetic replication. However, as mentioned previously, counterparty 
risk in swap-based replication exists. Additionally, there has been a regulatory concern 
for the swap-provider interconnectedness, which is a threat to financial stability in the 
event of financial crisis. (Vanguard 2013). 
 
In the context of this paper, only funds with full physical replication are used, as 
replicating the underlying ETF portfolio created by the synthetic method is impossible 
for the majority of investors. Additionally, the sampling method is not relevant for the 
funds selected in this paper, as it is often used in more illiquid markets or asset classes, 
which are not in the scope of this study. 
 
 
2.4. Stock co-movement 
 
The significance of the stock correlations and co-movement has been studied widely. 
Barberis et al. (2005) investigate the common factors driving the returns of certain groups 
of stocks together. Logically, stock returns within similar industries or with similar 
fundamental attributes, such as value stocks and small-cap stocks, should be initially 
correlated to some extent. However, by assuming a frictionless economy with rational 
agents, the movement of stock prices should be attributed to its objectively forecasted 
cash flows and risk. This fundamental view of the stock co-movement explains some of 
the correlations but still leaves room for further investigation. 
 
The term co-movement in the financial context describes a strong correlation between 
assets. The correlation measures the statistical relationship between two variables. 
Pearson’s linear correlation coefficient measures the linear association of the inspected 
variables as follows: 
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Where 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) is the covariance between x and y and 𝜎𝑥 and 𝜎𝑦 are the standard 
deviations of x and y. 
 
The correlation coefficient is always between [-1,1], and the closer the coefficient is the 
limits, the stronger the linear relationship is. For the financial markets, beta coefficients 
are denoted by: 
 





The correlation has thus a direct effect on the measurement of stock beta. It should be 
noted here that the beta typically measures the stock sensitivity with the market index, 
and thus increased stock-stock correlations should not affect the standard beta coefficient 
here. However, for managing equity portfolios, correlations, and beta coefficients 
between stocks provide information about diversification in the portfolio. Furthermore, 
as during high volatility, stock correlations tend to increase (Connolly, Stivers & Sun 
2005), which further complicates and lessens the diversification benefits of pure equity 
portfolios. 
 
Barberis & Shleifer (2003) argued that investors tend to categorize assets before forming 
portfolios. These categories would include sorting by, for instance, market cap, industry, 
and profitability. When several investors use these same categorizations and their 
collective sentiment changes, co-movement on even seemingly unrelated assets can be 
experienced, even though the fundamental aspects of these companies might be 
uncorrelated. Naturally, this raises a question of whether the increasing amount of 
indexing and new categorizations created by market demand, such as Quality or ESG 
themed indexes, further increase correlations between the constituent stocks (Index 
Industry Association 2019). 
 
By forming these thematic indexes, index providers combine several different stocks with 
some predetermined common attributes to a basket that tracks the performance of each 
constituent as a single unit. As ETF providers create funds from these indexes, the ETF 
trading activity begins to affect the constituents’ trading activity as well, since the ETF 
share creation and redemption process relies on buying and selling constituents’ shares 
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on the market. This increases the correlation of trading volumes and co-movements 
between constituents (Greenwood & Sosner 2007). 
 
As the number of ETFs and institutional ownership in stocks has increased, Staer & 
Sottile (2018) investigated whether the equivalent volume or the indirect trading caused 
by ETF creation-redemption arbitrage mechanism is a useful indicator for analyzing the 
co-movement between the ETF constituent stocks. The equivalent volume measures the 
ratio of weighted trading volumes of the inspected stock and its parent ETF. Authors 
found out that ETF trading volumes comprise up to 70% of inspected stock’s volume. To 
further illustrate the significance, Apple Inc. (AAPL) has exposure to 323 different ETFs, 
and it is within the top 15 holdings for 179 of them. (ETF database 2019). Thus, the 
increasing ETF fund provider ownership in stocks will be an exciting topic to study 
further in the future. 
 
Authors came to a similar conclusion than Wurgler (2010), with his paper examining 
implications for growing index-linked investing. There is substantial proof that index-
linked investing affects fundamental prices of stocks and might distort them. However, 
the possible implications are currently difficult to measure, and scenarios where invested 
capital would unexpectedly mass shift from place to another, are hypothetical. Finally, 
Connolly et al. (2005) investigated the relationship between volatility and stock-bond and 
stock-stock correlations. The results indicated that higher levels of volatility, proxied by 
the VIX index, increased the stock-stock correlations. Additionally, more considerable 
absolute changes in VIX resulted in heightened correlations. 
 
From a macroeconomic point of view, stock correlations on the international level have 
also been studied extensively. Solnik, Boucrelle & Yann (1996) find that international 
correlations increase when the overall market volatility is high. The correlations for stocks 
and bonds tend to fluctuate over time but are excessive during high market volatility 
times. Especially, the French and German markets began to correlate more after their 
leading roles in the EU. Thus, additional macroeconomic factors can link even different 
countries’ stock markets to some extent with each other. 
 
 
2.5. Portfolio evaluation metrics 
 
As the essential activity in this thesis is to create portfolios continuously by the frequency 
of inspected events, the question how to evaluate the performance of these strategies 
32 
 
arises. In this section, the key metrics for portfolio evaluation in this paper are introduced. 
The most well-known and still broadly used pricing model, The Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM), implies the existence of a diversified market portfolio that all the 
investors should hold in combination with risk-free assets according to the risk appetite 
of the individual.  
 
As CAPM attempts to portray the functioning of the real world, some pre-existing 
assumptions of the conditions surrounding the model must be made. These assumptions 




As quickly seen, the assumptions of the CAPM generate a somewhat restricted outlook 
of the financial markets. Naturally, these assumptions are necessary to provide a unitary 
formula to explain stock returns, which does not have an infinite amount of exceptions. 
However, by even briefly inspecting Figure 2, most of the assumptions for both individual 
behavior and market structure are not present in the real financial markets. Despite this, 
CAPM provides an excellent framework to understand expected returns for the securities. 
The following formula describes the CAPM: 
 
 






b. All information is publicly available.
c. No taxes.
d. No transaction costs.
a. All assets are publicly held and trade on public 
exchanges, short positions are allowed, and investors can 
borrow or lend at a commong risk-free rate.
c. Investors have homogenous expectations (identical 
input lists).
b. Their planning horizon is a single period.
a. Investors are rational, mean-variance optimizers.
THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE CAPM





where:  𝐸(𝑟𝑖) = Expected return of the security i 
 𝐸(𝑟𝑚) = Expected market return 
 𝑟𝑓 = Risk-free rate 
 𝛽𝑖 = Beta of the security 
  
The deduced risk exposure or the beta, captured here, moves us to the next measure of 
investment performance. The Jensen’s alpha uses the CAPM market portfolio and treats 
the intercept as “alpha” or the abnormal return over the theoretical expected return of the 
inspected portfolio. 
 
(5) 𝛼𝑝 =  𝑟𝑝 − [𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑝(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓)] 
 
 
where: 𝑟𝑝 = Portfolio return 
 𝑟𝑚 = Market return 
 𝑟𝑓 = Risk-free rate 
 𝛽𝑝 = Beta of the portfolio 
 
After the generally used beta and alpha, also well-known risk-adjusted performance 
measure, the Sharpe ratio is introduced. The Sharpe ratio evaluates the portfolio 
performance by its return and the standard deviation or volatility of the portfolio return. 
Thus, it forms a ratio of how much the portfolio produces excess return compared to the 









where: 𝑟𝑝 = Portfolio return 
 𝑟𝑓 = Risk-free rate 
 𝜎𝑝 = Standard deviation of the portfolio 
 
As CAPM and its by-products have got their share of critique during their long history, it 
is necessary to visit more current methods used in this paper. Fama & French (1993) 
satisfy non-systematic risk sources by accounting for three identified risk factors. 
Following the model’s popularity, authors expanded the model further to five relevant 




The first three risk factors identified are the market excess return MKT, which is the 
value-weighted return of all U.S. CRSP (The Center for Research in Security Prices) firms 
listed in a major US stock exchange, minus the US one-month t-bill rate. SMB factor is 
the average return of nine small equity portfolios minus the average return of nine big 
equity portfolios: 
 
(7) 𝑆𝑀𝐵(𝐵/𝑀) = 1/3(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ)
−  1/3(𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤ℎ𝑡) 
 
 
(8) 𝑆𝑀𝐵(𝑂𝑃) = 1/3(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑅𝑜𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡 + 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘)





(9) 𝑆𝑀𝐵(𝐼𝑁𝑉) = 1/3(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙
+ 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒) −  1/3(𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
+ 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒) 
 
 




The HML factor is the return spread of high book-to-market minus low book-to-market 
stocks: 
 
(11) 𝐻𝑀𝐿 = 1/2(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) − 1/2(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ
+ 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ) 
 
 
Additionally, for the five-factor model, the RMW factor describes the return spread of 
robust operating profitability minus weak operating profitability stocks: 
 
(12) 𝑅𝑀𝑊 = 1/2(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑅𝑜𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑅𝑜𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡) − 1/2(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘
+ 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘) 
 
 
Furthermore, the CMA factor is the average return of stocks making investments 





(13) 𝐶𝑀𝐴 = 1/2(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒)
− 1/2(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒) 
 
 
By combining the five estimated risk factors to a single factor model, we get the following 
Fama French 5-factor model (FF5): 
 
(14) 𝑟𝑝 − 𝑟𝑓 =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝,𝑀𝐾𝑇(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) + 𝛽𝑝,𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽𝑝,𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿
+ 𝛽𝑝,𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑅𝑀𝑊 + 𝛽𝑝,𝐶𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑀𝐴 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
 
where: 𝑟𝑝 = Portfolio return 
 𝑟𝑚 = Market return 
 𝑟𝑓 = Risk-free rate 
 𝛼𝑝 = 5-factor alpha 
 𝛽𝑝,𝑀𝐾𝑇 = Sensitivity to the Market excess return 
 𝛽𝑝,𝑆𝑀𝐵 = Sensitivity to the SMB factor 
 𝛽𝑝,𝐻𝑀𝐿 = Sensitivity to the HML factor 
 𝛽𝑝,𝑅𝑀𝑊 = Sensitivity to the RMW factor 
 𝛽𝑝,𝐶𝑀𝐴 = Sensitivity to the CMA factor 
 𝜀𝑖 = Error term 
 
The firm character variables, or the risk factors, were selected by the history of 
observations that these factors predict deviations from the average returns consistent with 
the CAPM, and by not accounting for them, all by-products of CAPM should be 
unreliable as the results contain these identified risk factors.  
 
Finally, as this paper is motivated to provide solutions to the issue mentioned by Lynch 
et al. (2019) regarding the lack of fundamental analysis in the portfolio creation phase, in 
this thesis, Piotroski F-Score (Piotroski 2000) is used as a fundamental proxy to mimic 
fundamental analysis that separates fundamentally good firms from bad firms and 
provides easy, systematic alternative for fundamental analysis. 
 
F-Score uses accounting-based historical company information and conveys this 
information as a score between 0 and 9. The score is totaled from succeeding in nine 
categories that award points by either 1 or 0. Each outsider stock gets their score from the 
most recent annual report published from the time of the portfolio formation. Thus, as 
with ratio analysis in general, there can be significant staleness with the relevancy of the 
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F-Score, if the portfolio formation date is close to the next annual report’s release date. 
For the F-Score measurement, three major groups can be noted: profitability measures, 
leverage and liquidity measures, and operating efficiency. 
 
Under these three groups, nine criteria are introduced. The different criteria and their 
groups are introduced in the table below: 
 
 
  PROFITABILITY success (1) failure (0) 
1 RETURN ON ASSETS If positive in current year If negative 
2 OPERATING CASH FLOW If positive in current year If negative 
3 CHANGE IN RETURN OF ASSETS If ROA higher in current year than last year If lower 
4 ACCRUALS If OPERATING CASH FLOW/TOTAL ASSETS 
is higher than ROA in current year 
If lower 
        
  
  LEVERAGE AND LIQUIDITY success (1) failure (0) 
5 CHANGE IN LEVERAGE If ratio lower in current year than last year If higher 
6 CHANGE IN CURRENT RATIO If ratio higher in current year than last year If lower 
7 CHANGE IN NUMBER OF SHARES If no new shares were issued last year If new shares 
were issued 
        
  OPERATING EFFICIENCY success (1) failure (0) 
8 CHANGE IN GROSS MARGIN If margin higher in current year than last year If margin lower 
9 CHANGE IN ASSET TURNOVER If ratio higher in current year than last year If ratio lower 
 
Figure 3. The criteria for the Piotroski F-Score measurement. 
 
As stated, the total F-Score is the sum of all successfully passed criteria for the company. 
Thus, the fundamentally best companies should possess an F-Score of 9 and the worst 0. 
Naturally, making fundamental analysis based on a single proxy can rarely be completely 
interchangeable with discretionary analysis. However, for this study, it should be 
sufficient to show that applying even some fundamental analysis for the case companies 
could improve the returns.  
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
The amount of research discussing both the impact of ETFs on the financial markets and 
passive indexing has expanded rapidly. As the amount of U.S. passive equity assets 
passed the amount of active assets the first time in August 2019 (Bloomberg 2019a), it is 
expected that the trend of passive investing and simultaneously, the amount of research 
provided on the subject, will further increase. This chapter will proceed as follows: first, 
the research on passive investing in general and qualities and reasons for stock 
correlations. Secondly, studies investigating ETFs and their effects on the efficiency on 
the financial markets and their underlying stocks are presented. Finally, studies covering 
the low stock beta anomaly are presented, as this paper takes a very similar contrarian 
approach by sorting ETF constituents by their betas-to-ETFs. 
 
 
3.1. Previous research on passive investing 
 
The effect of indexing on the efficiency of stock prices has been studied widely. Already 
in 1986, Harris & Gurel (1986) examine the effect of stock inclusions and exclusions 
from the S&P 500 index. By the teachings of the EMH, stock prices should not be affected 
even from trading large blocks of stocks simultaneously if the seller does not possess 
private information about the stock. Thus, the stock prices should be elastic, and the sale 
itself should not affect the prices. 
 
The changes in the composition of the S&P 500 index often induce large-scale purchases 
for the new constituents. The selection criteria for the index is based on a well-known 
criterion which should not reveal any new information about the future returns for the 
stocks selected in the index. In other words, no significant price impact should be 
expected from this event. However, the authors find excessive shifts in volume and a 
statistically significant increase of 3% in new constituents’ prices. To explain this effect, 
the authors introduce a price-pressure hypothesis that suggests that the investors who 
provide liquidity in the steep demand shifts must be compensated for the costs and risks 
they bear in these fast-paced transactions. 
 
Following the S&P 500 constituent changes theme, Vijh (1994) finds that the betas of 
stocks included in the S&P 500 index tend to be overstated, and for the stocks not included 
in the index, betas are understated. The author suggests that the increases in betas and 
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decreases in the positive autocorrelations the reason for the trading volume increases of 
the average S&P 500 stocks. The price pressure, or the excess volatility, is the price that 
needs to be paid to trade a large number of portfolio constituents with limited liquidity. 
 
The issue linked with the inexplainable excessive stock correlations, or co-movements, is 
discussed by Barberis et al. (2005), who introduce three different views for stock co-
movement. The first, “fundamentals” view can be considered the traditional position, 
where the correlations between different stocks can be explained by their fundamental 
attributes, such as cash-flows or discount rates. The second, “category-based” view, is an 
effect from investors grouping different securities, i.e., including stocks to a specific 
index, which increases their correlations as the inclusions and exclusions are executed 
systematically by constant measures. 
 
The third view, “habitat-based” co-movement, is a product of investors systematically 
restricting themselves from trading individual stocks, which again increases the co-
movement between these stocks. As the traditional view of stock correlation, the 
“fundamentals” view has been challenged by anomalies such as Siamese-twin stocks, 
other explanations for stock co-movement are required. The “category-based” view can 
be used as an explanation of why certain groups such as small-cap stocks, industry-related 
stocks, or bonds tend to correlate, even though their cash flows are mostly uncorrelated.  
 
As investors tend to categorize and subconsciously form classifications for stocks, 
arbitrary links between stocks are created. Simplified investment process and systematic 
asset allocation rules of portfolio managers make the index constituent stocks even further 
correlated, which may create investing opportunities during category-based selloffs. In 
other words, even just the inclusion of a stock to an index may affect its returns, even 
though these returns might not be fundamentally validated. (Barberis et al. 2005). 
 
In contrast, Chen, Singal and Whitelaw (2016) show that with robust, univariate 
regressions, the excess co-movement from Barberis et al. (2005) study almost entirely 
disappears. As regressions used to capture excessive co-movement are bivariate, before 
and after the inspected event, authors show that coefficients captured by the bivariate 
models are extremely sensitive to small changes in parameters. Thus, it is questionable 





Authors find that momentum has a significant effect on the beta patterns in the Barberis 
et al. (2005) study, which the authors did not control for. Additionally, using Dimson 
(1979) coefficient adjustment with leads and lags explains more than 50% of the effect 
from the original study, in which the adjustment accounted for only one third of the effect. 
The authors conclude that excessive co-movement is most likely due to beta changes for 
momentum winner stocks. 
 
Macro factors and global events have also been studied as the source of excessive co-
movements. Bekaert, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2014) investigate the contagion of the 
2007 – 2009 financial crisis to 415 different country and industry portfolios. Authors find 
evidence of contagion by estimating with factor model with global and domestic factors, 
but the model only explains 75% of the total return variation in the study. Authors also 
note that even though the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis originated from the United States, 
they find weak evidence of the contagion from US markets to global equity markets. 
Instead, they find a contagion link between the domestic markets and the individual 
domestic portfolios. Thus, the investors in the global crisis of 2007 – 2009 were more 
inclined to punish markets with weak economic fundamentals and poor sovereign ratings. 
 
On the other hand, Parsley & Popper (2020) apply a simple gauge of return co-movement 
that decomposes the within-market market returns variance. The authors find that return 
co-movements are not necessarily tied to country-specific factors such as country risk or 
investor protections, as the Bekaert et al. (2014) suggest, albeit in the context of the 
financial crisis of 2007 – 2009. The return co-movements are instead related to shorter-
term variables that portray international macroeconomic policy stability and suggest 
future firm-level research for properly linking return co-movement with firm-level 
variables such as foreign ownership, corporate culture, or corporate structure. 
 
Returning to firm-level research, Coles et al. (2020) study the effect of index investing 
on single-stock prices. Authors demonstrate that index investing introduces noise into 
stock prices but does not directly affect long-run price efficiency. Stocks with higher 
proportion of index ownership have higher correlations with index movements and 
deviate more from random walk. Authors further show that index re-balancing causes 
significant changes in the company ownership composition and increased passive 
ownership effects in higher volatility. By investigating the set of stocks after assignment 
to the Russel 2000 index, the authors conclude that index inclusion has an immediate 
effect of increased correlations with other index members and increased volatility. Thus, 




The trend of proportionally increasing fund provider or institutional investor ownership 
in listed companies is especially intriguing, as the trend is relatively new and continuously 
strengthening. Some critique for the common ownership between competitors has been 
published by Azar, Schmalz and Tecu (2018), who investigate the U.S. airline industry 
and its concentrated ownership base. The paper inspects the common ownership mainly 
from an antitrust perspective, but the reduced competitiveness between the firms that the 
authors found raises the question of whether the common ownership has implications for 
the stock price processes. 
 
By inspecting further, the index inclusions and firms’ reactions to these events Yu (2008) 
finds that the stock’s inclusion to S&P 500 index is an enhancing factor to combat 
earnings management due to the increased analyst coverage the inclusion brings. In other 
words, a higher number of analysts covering the firms ensures a lower amount of earnings 
management by the firms. The increased informational flow decreases the asymmetric 
information present and has positive implications for corporate governance as well. 
 
Greenwood & Sosner (2007) investigate a unique sample of broad Nikkei 225 index 
redefinition in April 2000. A total of 30 stock additions and deletions happened 
simultaneously, and the authors found proof of excess index-linked co-movement from 
the subsequent stock returns. For the added stocks, correlations of trading volumes with 
Nikkei 225 constituent stocks increased, while for the deletions, they decreased, thus 
implying that added stocks became exposed to the trading shocks experienced by other 
members. 
 
Moreover, Petajisto (2011) finds that the index additions and deletions have a significant 
economically material impact on the stocks included in or excluded from the index. By 
inspecting S&P 500 and Russel 2000 additions, the author finds a price impact of +8.8% 
and +4.7%, respectively. In contrast, exclusion announcements yielded -15.1% and -4.6% 
price effect on the event day. As the index inclusions in the investigated indexes are 
driven mainly by firm market cap and industry representation, the firm fundamentals are 
not drastically changing due to the index inclusion, which would explain the sudden event 
price shock. Additionally, the found effect on the stock prices is gradual, instead of being 
fully incorporated to the prices immediately after the announcement.  
 
Finally, Belasco, Finke and Nanigian (2012) investigate the impact of passive investing 
in the corporate valuations in the S&P 500 index and find that the constituent valuations 
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increased by up to 167 bps relative to non-constituent stocks due to S&P 500 fund money 
flow. The impact additionally persists after the flow occurs and does not dissipate 
immediately. The paper’s findings implicate that the preference shift towards passive 
index investing reduces the informational efficiency of stock prices, and these 
discrepancies are not combatted efficiently enough by arbitrageurs. 
 
Overall, the body of literature for passive and index investing is vast and convincing. 
Index constituent changes have been shown to affect the price processes of index stocks 
in both inclusions and exclusion events Petajisto (2011). The fundamental properties of 
the stocks cannot explain these price-process changes, nor the information that the 
inclusion event generates (Barberis et al. 2005; Harris & Gurel 1986). However, the 
indexing has been studied to provide better price efficiency due to transformed ownership 
composition after index inclusion (Coles et al. 2020). Thus, while indexing has been 
shown to generate noise in the stock prices, it also increases efficiency by the heightened 
informational flow, corporate governance (Yu 2008), and steadier ownership base with 
large institutional investors. 
 
 
3.2. Previous research on ETFs 
 
Todorov (2019) studies the ETF induced price impact on the commodity and volatility 
asset classes. The author replicates and decomposes the value of the VIX futures 
contracts, extracts the non-fundamental component from the prices, and captures a return 
of 18.5% that is strongly related to the ETF rebalancing. Thus, the study results show that 
the passive (ETF) funds actively affect the prices of their underlying assets, commodities, 
and VIX in this instance. As the constant innovation for new ETFs to provide exposure 
to less traditional, alternative asset classes is continuous, these new investment vehicles 
tend to stay relatively under-researched. Thus, it is difficult to fully assess whether there 
are significant negative consequences of this constant trend of passive indexing. 
 
Da & Shive (2018) provide evidence on the co-movement effect caused by arbitrageurs 
for ETFs. By inspecting a sample of U.S. equity ETF holdings, authors find a link between 
ETF activity and return co-movement on stock level. ETF arbitrage, i.e. creation-
redemption process, allows the APs to balance ETF market prices for the trade for 
arbitrage profits. As discussed in the theoretical background section, APs can buy 
discount ETF shares, redeem the assets, and sell them to the market by the ETF’s NAV 
price, thus making immediate profit.  
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Authors discover that if a stock has high total ETF ownership, it co-moves more with the 
market. The effect of ETF holding in stock is more substantial than the effect of mutual 
fund or other institutional holding, resulting 0.03 increase in beta for a 1% market cap 
increase in ETF ownership. Additionally, ETF turnover has a link for stock co-movement 
with the market, as the effect is augmented for small stocks with low turnover. The 
underlying question is whether the link between ETF activity and stock co-movement 
implies better incorporation of information or excessive noise from non-fundamental 
demand created by the ETF arbitrage mechanism. 
 
The authors find negative autocorrelation in ETF daily returns, which is magnified if the 
ETF turnover is high. The findings support the assumption that ETFs may cause excessive 
co-movement by the non-fundamental shocks the ETF arbitrage causes. As the stocks 
with higher ETF activity have more often negative betas to lagged market returns, it is 
suggested that ETF activity affects excess co-movement. 
 
Further inspecting the effects of ETF arbitrage on the underlying constituent prices Shim 
(2019) finds that increased ETF trading after 2008 has led to higher arbitrage co-
movement. The author introduces the concept of arbitrage sensitivity, which combines 
the sensitivity of price impact and portfolio weight. The market price balancing creation-
redemption process practiced by arbitrageurs spills over to constituent stocks and induces 
price pressure. As the arbitrage is executed by trading constituent stocks by their index 
weights and further trading for ETF shares (or vice versa), constituents are moving based 
on the arbitrage process, not fundamental demand. 
 
Additionally, the author investigates whether ETF stock betas or the return of underlying 
constituent stock regressed against the ETF return. The relationship between arbitrage 
sensitivity and ETF betas are found to be positive, especially during higher trading 
volume periods from 2008 onwards. Changes in trading volume match the arbitrage 
sensitivity’s ability to forecast ETF betas. To summarize, arbitrage co-movement is 
shown to impact underlying constituent prices, and as the stock covariances have 
significant implications for risk exposures, prevalent ETF arbitrage at large trading 
volumes might distort the perceived risk for the stock. 
 
Ben-David et al. (2018) investigated the relationship between high ETF ownership and 
the underlying stocks’ volatilities. The authors find a significant link between ETF 
ownership, higher volatility, and negative autocorrelation. The average ETF ownership 
in S&P 500 stocks has increased from 0.14% in 2000 to 7.05% in 2015. Thus, this 
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significant portion is passively owned by fund providers and depends entirely on the logic 
of each ETF’s index-weighting methods. As the trend of passive investing and 
simultaneously higher ETF ownership in stocks keeps increasing, further studies on the 
effects of ownership commonality should be produced. 
 
Petajisto (2017) inspects ETFs’ pricing efficiency by analyzing the creation-redemption 
process and the amount of ETF premiums and discounts in the market. As the popularity 
of ETFs has increased heavily over recent years, problems with their relative efficiency 
should be highlighted. The author investigates a broad cross-section of ETFs and shows 
that even though the average ETF premium is only 6bps, in certain ETF classes such as 
U.S. municipal and high-yield bonds, international equity and international bond funds 
show significant average mispricing ranging from -13bps to 31bps.  
 
The author further illustrates the significance of the ETF premiums and discounts by 
creating a trading strategy exploiting these mispricings. For individual investors, fund 
NAV should be used as a convenient measure to check whether the ETF inspected is 
currently cheap or expensive. Additionally, the cost-conscious investor should be aware 
that for some ETF classes, additional expenses can be caused in the form of relative 
mispricing between the NAV and market price. Overall, most of the ETFs are relatively 
efficiently priced and show minimal average premiums or discounts. 
 
A redeeming factor for index-linked co-movement is introduced by Glosten et al. (2016), 
who argue that ETF activity might increase short-run informational efficiency for stocks 
in weak informational segments such as in situations of underlying low liquidity or short-
sale constraints. As with ETF trading, the creation-redemption process allows investors 
to trade a basket of underlying securities to ETF shares, and vice versa, this feature could 
prove itself useful in the times of short-selling constraints. As in the financial crisis of 
2008, short selling was banned for 797 stocks, ETFs were exempted from the ban. This 
process could have been used to circumvent this constraint. Thus, investors looking to 
take short positions against specific companies could use ETFs to short these stocks 
indirectly. 
 
Additionally, as Boone & White (2015) study the effect of institutional ownership, in this 
instance, ETF institution ownership found out that more extensive institutional ownership 
results in better corporate governance and more careful investor scrutiny.  Glosten et al.  
(2016) suggest that by this finding, increased ETF ownership should increase the 
informational efficiency for index members that do not possess these traits beforehand. 
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The finding that stock’s index-inclusion increases its informational properties is sensible 
and more studies should investigate this topic to find out whether the effect is magnified 
with broader and more well-known indexes. 
 
To provide evidence for ETF activity and information incorporation, Glosten et al. (2016) 
study the effects of the ETF activity and Post-Earnings Announcement Drift (PEAD) 
anomaly. The PEAD reflects a situation where stock prices experience a positive trend 
after positive earnings announcements and negative after negative announcements. This 
anomaly shows that the fundamental information from the earnings is not incorporated to 
the stock prices immediately, but only partially in the time of the announcement. Thus, 
the stock price keeps drifting after the announcement in the direction of the surprise. The 
authors further show that high ETF activity is associated with reduced PEAD strategy 
returns.  
 
Brown, Davies and Ringgenberg (2020) further investigate this non-fundamental demand 
of stocks. They use ETFs as a tool to identify the non-fundamental demand, as ETFs have 
become an increasingly popular category-based asset and they are generally passively 
managed, which removes the possible fund manager skill factor from the equation. The 
ETF fund flows are observed, as the ETFs arbitrage pricing mechanism, or creation-
redemption process makes ETFs vulnerable to non-fundamental demand shocks. When 
the ETF premium arises, the mechanism correcting the mispricing activates, and new ETF 
shares are created, which generates ETF fund flows.  
 
ETF flows provide unique measurement for non-fundamental demand as authors show 
that flows are mostly independent from fundamental demand. Compared to other studied 
fund flows such as hedge fund or mutual fund flows, which have been shown to contain 
important information about investor demands, ETF flows are shown not to possess these 
attributes. The authors further show that these fund flows can predict future constituent 
asset returns. Authors categorize the ETFs in terms of the highest premium and highest 
discount to decile portfolios that go long on the largest discount ETFs and shorts the 
highest premium ETFs. The returns on these portfolios further show the ETF return 
predictability by its fund flows. 
 
Ernst (2020) theoretically models the constituent stock and parent ETF trading in tandem 
and shows that the strategy leads to stock price-discovery from the ETF. The effect is 
dependent on the stock weight in the ETF and the level of asymmetric information. 
Furthermore, crucial stock-specific information such as earnings dates or news about the 
45 
 
company leads to increases in single-stock-ETF simultaneous trades, which can comprise 
up to 2% of daily ETF volume. Thus, when the investors have substantial stock-specific 
information, they tend to trade both the ETF and the constituent. 
 
Finally, Lynch et al. (2019) inspect opportunities created by ETF selloffs using a 
contrarian strategy of buying oversold ETF constituent stocks. Authors justify their 
strategy by illustrating case studies where certain ETFs have experienced sudden selloff 
due to announcement considering their covered industry. Authors argue that even if new 
information about a particular market segment is published, the new fundamental 
information rarely affects every stock in the index on a fundamental basis. As several 
studies have shown (Da & Shive 2018; Shim 2019), excess co-movement in index-linked 
constituent stocks, during high volume selloff stocks that should not fundamentally 
experience a price decrease, often move in tandem with the other stocks in the index. 
 
This creates opportunities for active investors to benefit from the co-movement caused 
by passive investors. Authors suggest finding “outsider” constituents from ETFs to 
capture the non-fundamental aspects of selloffs. The main questions with ETF selloffs 
are to investigate why this specific ETF category is being sold and should all its 
constituents be sold off with it. The authors group these outsiders by merely measuring 
constituent betas to the ETF they are part of. The least sensitive i.e., lowest ETF beta 
stocks, are then bought after high volume selloffs to capture the co-movement effect from 
the index inclusion, which should not be warranted by fundamental reasons.  
 
The results show that this trading strategy proved profitable for 11 of the 12 inspected 
ETFs when held for 40 days. Authors note that this strategy should prove useful for 
individual investors as a form of screening and then conducting fundamental analysis on 
the highlighted companies. I.e., does the selloff warrant the price drop for this investigated 
stock. Additionally, during high volume selloffs, correlations among the index 
constituents increase significantly, which cannot be rationalized by sole fundamental 
reasons. 
 
Altogether, studies examining the ETF induced stock co-movements and inefficiencies 
retell mostly the findings of the effects of the index investing. As the ETFs follow 
primarily indexes generated for these products and likewise, this is expected to produce 
similar inefficiencies to stock prices than indexing itself. Thus, the ETFs are just 
convenient proxies to investigate the index-induced effects. Incredibly intriguing is that 
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as the amounts invested to ETFs grow day by day, more convincing and reliable studies 
can be produced about the effects of indexing to asset price efficiency. 
 
 
3.3. Previous research on the low beta anomaly 
 
Finally, as this paper focuses heavily on measuring ETF constituent betas, which are in 
several instances with broad-index ETFs equivalent to the traditional beta measurements 
for these stocks, it is necessary to visit the research on the low beta anomaly. In a sense, 
the low beta anomaly works as a convenient theoretical framework behind the 
motivations in this paper and provides insight into how and why measuring the stock beta 
has been an effective way to capture originally unintended returns. 
 
The expected return-beta relationship set by CAPM is that only beta, or the perceived risk 
of the company, affects the returns of the stock. This essentially means that stocks with 
higher beta can generate higher returns than low beta stocks by taking more risk. Bodie 
et al. (2009). However, it has been exhaustively studied that the CAPM derived security 
market line (SML) is flatter than presented by the original theory (Black, Jensen and 
Scholes 1972). Thus, the unconstrained investors should overweight low beta and 
underweight high beta stocks to capture this discrepancy. 
 
Frazzini & Pedersen (2014) create a market-neutral factor strategy of Betting Against 
Beta (BAB) that invests in low beta assets and shorts high beta assets to capture the return 
spread between low and high beta securities. This strategy and its methods will be 
inspected more closely at the end of the next chapter, but the overall idea and the results 
of the BAB factor are necessary to present here for reviewing purposes. The authors find 
the same relative return flatness first investigated by Black et al. (1972) in 18 of the 19 
international equity markets inspected. 
 
Additionally, the authors propose that constrained investors tend to hold higher betas. 
Mutual funds and individual investors are leverage constrained and actively try to combat 
that disadvantage by investing in riskier assets. Conversely, funds with leveraged buyout 
capabilities and Warren Buffet’s Berkshire Hathaway buy stocks with betas below one 





Another takeaway from the high-beta stock underperformance against the low-beta stocks 
is by Baker, Bradley and Wurgler (2011). The authors suggest that the anomalous 
relationship with the betas can be partly explained by the institutional investors’ 
motivations to beat their fixed benchmarks, which discourages arbitrage activity. The 
high-beta and high-volatility stocks underperformed the low-beta and low-volatility 
stocks by significant difference when divided to top (high-beta, high-volatility) and 




By looking at a dollar invested in 1968 to both top and bottom quintile portfolios, the 
difference is staggering. One dollar invested to lowest beta and lowest volatility asset 
portfolio increased to $59.55, whereas the dollar invested to the top quintile portfolio was 
worth $0.58.  
 
Following this finding, Christoffersen & Simutin (2017) further show that fund managers 
controlling large pension assets have higher exposures to high beta assets while keeping 
their tracking error low from their benchmarks. This finding implies that benchmarking 
may leave fund managers overly exposed to high-beta securities and leave low-beta 
Graph 5. Results of the top and bottom beta + volatility quintiles (Baker et al. 2011). 
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securities underweighted. This may further reinforce the beta related pricing anomalies 
and explain some of the negative alphas generated by high-beta stocks.  
 
On the other hand, Cederburg & O’Doherty (2016) find that the conditional beta 
estimated for the high-minus-low beta portfolio negatively covaries with both equity 
premium and market volatility. This makes the generated alpha downwards biased and 
produces skewed results. The authors model the conditional market risk for the high-
minus-low beta portfolios and further find that the conditional CAPM explains the betting 
against beta anomaly. 
Authors provide five determinants of market exposures that may explain the beta-sorted 
portfolio dispersions from firm-level betas. These five characteristics are likely to forecast 
the shifts with the betas. The characteristics the authors found are economic 
considerations from the initial public offerings, heterogeneity of investment opportunities 
for the firms, heterogeneity in the used firm leverage, idiosyncratic risk, and economy-
wide conditions for funding. Authors further analyze the relationship between the betas 
and these characteristics by regressing the time-series of portfolio betas against these five 
factors and showing that the firm investment opportunities, leverage, and idiosyncratic 
risk influence the high-beta portfolio betas. 
 
Additionally, Hong & Sraer (2016) find that high-beta assets are prone to speculation and 
further overpricing. Due to investor disagreement of the high-beta assets payoff 
processes, these stocks experience more significant divergence of investor opinion. At 
the times when this aggregated disagreement is low, the estimated SML is upward 
sloping. With high disagreement, the SML flattens, and higher beta generates lower 
expected returns. The authors measure the market disagreement by calculating the 
standard deviation of the analyst forecasts for long-term EPS growth. When the deviation 
increases, the aggregate disagreement in the market increases. 
 
Authors show that high-beta stocks are more speculative due to high sensitivity towards 
disagreement of their future cash flows. Because of this and the short sale constraints 
experienced by many investors, high-beta stocks are often overpriced compared to low-
beta stocks. However, during low aggregate disagreement, the SML is upwards sloping 
as the CAPM suggests, but with high aggregate disagreement, the SML flattens and 
produces return patterns similar to (Black et al., 1972; Frazzini & Pedersen, 2014). 
 
Finally, Schneider, Wagner & Zechner (2020) find that the low-risk anomalies are most 
often arisen by the co-skewness risk. The authors estimated that the option-implied 
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residual co-skewness factor explains most of the alphas generated by the BAB and betting 
against volatility factors. The authors explain that the investors demand compensation 
from the negative co-skewness linked to the asset’s CAPM beta. As a result, the positive 
alphas generated by BAB and betting against volatility disappear when the co-skewness 
is controller for. 
 
To summarize these bodies of research described above, several authors find passive 
indexing to have an effect on the prices of the underlying securities that they are following 
(Barberis et al. 2005; Coles et al. 2020; Greenwood & Sosner 2007; Petajisto 2011; 
Todorov 2019). Additionally, ETFs as a relatively new but increasingly popular asset 
class has similar but not yet very well quantified effects on the liquidity and price 
efficiency of their underlying assets (Brown et al. 2020; Da & Shive 2018; Glosten et al. 
2016; Shim 2019). Finally, the low beta anomaly has been shown to yield abnormal 
returns in a wide cross-sectional context (Frazzini & Pedersen 2014). However, the 
freshness of the topic has generated opposing studies that have been able to explain some 
of the factors impacting the lower returns of the high-beta securities (Cederburg & 






4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This chapter introduces the collected data and methodologies used to create a systematic 
trading strategy utilizing ETF constituent stock co-movement after high fund trading 
volume events. Following the general description of the data collected and its properties 
compared to earlier studies, motivations for the sample restrictions and brief introductions 
of the ETFs used are presented. Finally, methodologies to capture abnormal volume days 
and trading strategies involving these events are introduced, and additional methods to 
assess the portfolio returns are presented. 
 
 
4.1. Data description 
 
As this paper primarily focuses on using systematic outsider beta-to-ETF stock strategy 
with broad-index and factor funds, most of the ETFs are chosen with as similar properties 
as possible compared to previous studies. Thus, the amount of assets under management 
(AUM) is one critical condition. As the funds Lynch et al. (2019) investigated in their 
paper were very large in terms of AUM and liquid in terms of trading volumes, funds in 
this paper have been chosen with similar factors, but with a focus on European broad-
index and factor funds. 
 
However, as the scope of this paper is to create outsider portfolios from fund holdings, 
some additional restrictions apply for the sample. Firstly, mainly one unitary region 
focused ETFs are inspected. This restriction is used to reduce the portfolio creation 
timing-based issues such as market holidays and price staleness induced from 
international diversification. As the price staleness distorts the measured ETF betas, most 
of the ETFs chosen in this paper are domestic. Other key restrictions were unreliable or 
lacking daily fund volume data for newer ETFs that were thus dismissed from the 
screening.  
 
Secondly, creating portfolios from historical fund holdings requires fund providers to 
properly communicate the historical fund holding data to account for constant index 
rebalancing and reconstitution. By limitations of comprehensive database access and the 
lack of connections to fund providers resulted in the usage of only iShares provided ETFs. 
This is simply because iShares provides the most comprehensive historical fund holding 
data by far compared to other fund providers. In practice, this restriction should not have 
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any material effect on the results, as iShares, owned by BlackRock, is currently the largest 
ETF provider in the world and provides a broad range of funds spanning markets 
worldwide (iShares 2020b). 
 
Thus, by performing these additional restrictions to prepare the sample for the next step 
in this paper, the total amount of ETFs that are selected forms to 8 funds. For every 
inspected ETF, the daily return and volume data are gathered to firstly capture the 
abnormal ETF volume days and secondly generate portfolios from outsider ETF beta 
stocks. The following ETFs are selected for further study: 
 
 









IVV USA iShares Core S&P 500 ETF $219 872 5 571 000 
QUAL USA iShares MSCI USA Quality Factor ETF $19 954 1 536 000 
ISF GBR iShares Core FTSE 100 UCITS ETF $10 122 7 055 000 
EXS1 DEU iShares Core DAX UCITS ETF $6 953 484 000 
SXRT EUR iShares Core EURO STOXX 50 UCITS ETF $4 301 39 000 
SUAS USA iShares MSCI USA SRI UCITS ETF $2 765 294 000 
IESG EUR iShares MSCI Europe SRI UCITS ETF $1 629 3 000 
IH2O** INTL iShares Global Water UCITS ETF $1 028 10 000 
          
      Median Median 
      $5 627 389 000 
          
          
Notes: Market caps are denoted in ($m) millions of dollars, as of 08/2020. *Average daily volume 
during 08/2019 - 08/2020. **ETF contains globally diversified assets. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the selected ETFs. 
 
By inspecting the descriptive statistics for ETFs selected for further study, the total market 
cap of the ETFs investigated is approximately $266 billion, with the median market cap 
of $5.6 billion. In Lynch et al. (2019) paper that investigated only U.S.-based sector 
SPDRs, the total market cap approximately $480 billion, and the median market cap of 
$15 billion. Even though the sample in this thesis is smaller in terms of AUMs, the 
difference can be explained by U.S.-markets still being way more massive than European 
markets. By comparing trading volumes, U.S.-based sector SPRDs are averaging 5 to 15 
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million as daily volume, which is an important factor to consider when discussing the 
comparability of the achieved results. 
 
The motivation to inspect several ESG ETFs in addition to broad-index funds, even 
though their market caps and average trading volumes are on the lower end of the sample 
distribution, is the continually increasing relevancy of these instruments. ETFGI 
estimated the whole ESG ETF ecosystem to total over $67 billion in assets in February 
2020. Additionally, BlackRock predicts that its European ESG ETF assets will grow to 
$250 billion by 2028. (Markets Media 2020). 
 
By briefly focusing on the selected funds, IVV is equivalent to the SPY inspected in 
Lynch et al. (2019) study, with lower trading volumes and is used as a control group fund 
of sorts. ISF, EXS1, and SXRT are the largest European broad-index ETFs tracking FTSE 
100, DAX 30 and EURO STOXX 50. SUAS, IESG, and IH2O are ESG ETFs that track 
socially responsible screening criteria of MSCI USA, MSCI Europe, and Global water 
infrastructure, respectively. Finally, QUAL is an MSCI USA tracking fund with a quality 




4.2. Research Methodology 
 
In this paper, each of the selected funds is investigated by a daily return and volume data, 
from which “abnormal volume days” are days when the ETF trading volume exceeds 
three standard deviation threshold of past trading volumes. These abnormal volume days 
accompanied by a negative ETF return of at least -0.01% for the same day are titled  as 
ETF selloff days and are used as portfolio creation days. In the original Lynch et al. (2019) 
paper, the required negative return margin was not discussed further. Thus it is expected 
that the margin is not considerably strict for this strategy.  
 
Some critique can be put on the description of the methods in the Lynch et al. (2019) 
paper, as the negative return criteria for the selloff day could have been motivated better. 
It should be noted that increasing the required negative return margin for selloff days 
decreases the total number of selloff days captured. For instance, changing the return 
requirement from -0.01% for the day to -0.02% decreases the total amount of selloff days 
captured from 243 to 213. Setting the return requirement for -1% for the day would 
amount to 113 selloff days in total for this sample. However, as Lynch et al. (2019) did 
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not motivate the negative return requirement more precisely, even the slightest negative 
return for the day with abnormal ETF volume is counted as ETF selloff day. 
 
Abnormal volume days are identified with a Z-score of volume. Adapting Lynch et al. 
(2019) methods, a three-standard deviation threshold is used, where the abnormal volume 
day is recorded if the daily ETF volume inspected is three-standard deviations away from 
its past 40-day rolling mean. Mean, and standard deviation are exponentially weighted to 
bring relevancy in more recent events than historic. The Z-score on the day i is calculated 
the following way: 
 
(15) 







Where x is the ETF’s trading volume on the day i, and µ and σ are the exponentially 
weighted 40-day rolling mean and standard deviation to day i – 1. The weightings are 
made to each observation with an exponential weighting of the half-life of one-quarter of 
annual trading days (63 trading days). The weightings placed on each observation are 
calculated as follows: 
 
(16) 










Where n is the number of observation dates before the starting date. In practice, a half-
life of one quarter halves the weight of historical observations by a quarterly basis. Thus, 
volume observations one quarter away only weigh 50% of the most recent observation. 
When the abnormal volume days are captured, these dates are used to create the 
portfolios. The following table will highlight the amount of ETF selloff days and compare 













DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE SELLOFF DAYS 
ETF 









IVV iShares Core S&P 500 ETF 75 50 67 % 
QUAL iShares MSCI USA Quality Factor ETF 68 28 41 % 
ISF iShares Core FTSE 100 UCITS ETF 70 39 56 % 
EXS1 iShares Core DAX UCITS ETF 55 32 58 % 
SXRT iShares Core EURO STOXX 50 UCITS 65 24 37 % 
SUAS iShares MSCI USA SRI UCITS ETF 46 18 39 % 
IESG iShares MSCI Europe SRI UCITS ETF 50 21 42 % 
IH2O iShares Global Water UCITS ETF 59 31 53 % 
          
  Median 62 30 47 % 
  Total 488 243   
          
          
Notes: Full sample starts 01/2016 and ends 08/2020 resulting in a maximum total of 1165 sample 
days for each ETF. There are slight differences due to different market holidays in the US and 
European markets. Thus the number of selloff days between different ETFs is not fully comparable 
with each other. Abnormal volume days are days with ETF trading volume Z score over 3 from the 
past 40-day rolling volumes. Selloff days are these same days, but with accompanied negative ETF 
return of at least -0.01% for the day. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the selloff days. 
 
As seen in the descriptive statistics, for most of the traditional broad-index funds 
abnormal volume day is more than 50% of the time accompanied by a negative ETF 
return. Especially IVV, the largest fund in the sample, experienced a negative return 67% 
of the time that abnormal volume event of Z ≥ 3 was captured. On the other hand, the 
ETFs with fundamental factors tend to experience fewer selloff events compared to the 
total number of abnormal volume days, suggesting that the abnormal volume days these 
funds experienced were more often due to increased interest in the fund and thus 
accompanied with a positive return, instead of a selloff. 
 
In total, 243 selloff days are captured for the whole ETF and further adjusted to reduce 
clustering for overlapping portfolios. If two consecutive selloff days were observed 
within five trading days from each other, the portfolio is formed only from the older event 
date. This restriction decreases the total number of formed portfolios from 243 to 202 and 





The following graph will illustrate the cumulative development of the selloff days during 
the sample period of 01/2016 – 08/2020. 
 
 
In Graph 6, days with more than one event are plotted with the black bars, showing 
whether there are any periods with sample-wide clustering. As expected, a couple of 
important events can be captured immediately, mainly the 24.6.2016 Britain’s Brexit 
vote, 2018 February brief market selloff, and the recent COVID-19 related market 
downfall in the turn of 2020 February-March. All the eight funds observed surpassed the 
three-standard deviation threshold for the selloff event 18 times in total during the six 
days of 21.2 – 28.2.2020. However, as this event was a global risk-off for the equity asset 
class as a whole, the results compared to Lynch et al. (2019) might be inconsistent and 
will be discussed with additional detail later. 
 
4.2.1. Portfolio formation 
 
After capturing the abnormal volume days, outsider stock portfolios from the ETFs are 
formed. Portfolio starting dates are t+1 after selloff day t, to combat the fact that historical 



















Cumulative number of selloff days (01/2016 - 08/2020)
Cumulative Selloff days Selloff days
Graph 6. Cumulative number of selloff days. 
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on an ongoing basis, a portfolio could be formed even before the next day if it is apparent 
that the daily trading volume will break the required three-standard deviation threshold. 
 
To begin the portfolio formation, historical holding details for the ETFs are fetched for 
each abnormal volume day. The fund provider iShares displays the historical ETF 
holdings data for its ETFs updated daily for the last four months, and before that, data is 
updated monthly. Thus, for the historical abnormal volume days occurring between the 
monthly ETF holdings updates, the older holdings data and weightings are used for the 
outsider portfolio formation. Some caveats with the ETF portfolio replication would 
include the fact that in some instances, later privatized companies in the ETF holdings 
lacked the historical price data even before the privatization. Similarly, some ETFs had 
transition shares or rights in their holdings during the time of the event. These shares often 
represented a tiny fraction of the total portfolio and were thus eliminated.   
 
Next, daily historical return data for all the ETF holdings and the ETF itself are acquired. 
As the ETFs investigated in this paper are purely equity-based funds with physical 
replication, not much has to be done to clean the ETF holdings for the beta analysis. One 
additional detail for the ETF holdings replication process would be that cash and money 
market instruments are eliminated from the original ETF holdings, which often represent 
0.01 – 0.05% of the total ETF weight. This is done to ease the next ETF beta estimation 
step. 
 
The stock beta-to-ETF (𝛽𝐸𝑇𝐹) is estimated for every stock in the ETF after the abnormal 
volume event. Beta regression is exponentially weighted and is estimated from the event 
date t to t – 252, thus calculating one-year historical betas from daily data as follows: 
 





Where 𝑅𝑆 is the exponentially weighted stock return, 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐹 is the exponentially weighted 
ETF return, and Cov and Var are covariance and variance, respectively. The exponential 
weighting is done with a similar method than with the abnormal volume calculation in 
formula (16). The beta-to-ETF estimation differs from traditional beta estimation only 
because instead of using broad market index return, ETF return is used for each 




After calculating the 𝛽𝐸𝑇𝐹 for all the ETF holdings, the portfolio is formed from the lowest 
10% of the estimated 𝛽𝐸𝑇𝐹. Thus, the sensitivity of this portfolio (𝛽𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇) with respect to 
the ETF should be the following: 
 
(18) 
𝛽𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇 =  ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝛽𝐸𝑇𝐹
𝑛
𝑖=1
 |𝛽𝐸𝑇𝐹 = 1𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒 
 
 
Where 𝑤𝑖 is the assumed weighting for the outsider stock in the created portfolio. In the 
Lynch et al. (2019) paper, the authors used only equally weighted portfolios. In this paper, 
however, a total of three different portfolio weightings are used. Equal weighted, value-
weighted by proportional constituent weights in the fund, and finally fundamentally 
weighted. The motivation for value weighting portfolios is to capture possible additional 
effects of selloffs to outsiders with high weighting on the inspected ETF.  
 
The value weighting considers the original ETF holding weight for the constituent and 
uses it as in proportion against the other constituents selected in the portfolio. The 
fundamental weighting is measured by Piotroski F-Score for each outsider portfolio stock 
and weights the stocks with better historical fundamentals over worse. Table 3 illustrates 
a hypothetical weighting of 5 outsider stocks with different methods: 
 
 
  Stock 1 Stock 2 Stock 3 Stock 4 Stock 5 TOTAL 
ETF holding weight 10.0 % 2.5 % 2.0 % 5.0 % 0.1 %   
Outsider Portfolio value weight 51.0 % 12.8 % 10.2 % 25.5 % 0.5 % 100 % 
Outsider Portfolio equal weight 20.0 % 20.0 % 20.0 % 20.0 % 20.0 % 100 % 
Piotroski F-score 3 4 9 5 1   
Outsider Portfolio fundamental weight 13.6 % 18.2 % 40.9 % 22.7 % 4.5 % 100 % 
 
Table 3. Hypothetical weightings of 5 outsider constituents by different weighting methods. 
 
As seen, value weighting by original ETF holding weights can overweight single stock 
ownership in the outsider portfolio significantly. However, as the nature of this paper is 
to try to capture unintentional co-movement induced from ETF stock ownership, it is not 
necessarily unwanted to overweight these constituents that therefore, should experience 
co-movement on a more extensive degree due to their high weights in the original ETFs. 
Additionally, weighting portfolios by the fundamental Piotroski F-score factor 
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hypothesized that the fundamentally solid companies could be overweighted compared 
to poorly performing ones. 
 
A portfolio of 10% lowest 𝛽𝐸𝑇𝐹 stocks is generated after the day of the abnormal volume 
event. All stocks are bought long and held for 40 days. Portfolio returns are calculated 
alongside with the abnormal returns (ARs), cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), and 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) adapted from (Lynch et al., 2019) with 
the following formulas: 
 
(19) 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐹 − [𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇(𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐹 − 𝑅𝑓)] 
 
 










CARs are calculated for each formed portfolio. The lowest number of abnormal volume 
events recorded and portfolios created for one ETF was for SUAS with 17 events. The 
highest number of events was recorded for IVV with 36 total acceptable events. After 













The significance of the possible returns and abnormal returns generated by these 
portfolios are then estimated by Wilcoxon signed-rank statistical test, as the short 40-day 
holding period implies non-normality in the sample. To recap the three key points of 
interest in this paper introduced in the first chapter, the three hypotheses set are presented 
again more explicitly. Hence, the first hypothesis was stated as follows: 
 
H1: The low beta-to-ETF stocks generate statistically significant abnormal returns after 




For this hypothesis, the two-tailed test with Wilcoxon signed-rank test is utilized. The 
signed-rank test is a traditional non-parametric test for event study abnormal return 
settings. This method was used by Lynch et al. (2019) and is formed as follows:  
 
(22)  𝐻𝑜: 𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 = 0 
𝐻1: 𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 ≠ 0  
 
1. Differences (𝑑𝑖) between each observation (𝑥𝑖) and the hypothesized median  
𝑑𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 − 0 are calculated. 
2. Each |𝑑𝑖| is given a rank from 1 to n. 
3. Ranks are labeled with their signs (+ or  – ). 
4. Calculate the sum of the ranks with positive 𝑑𝑖, 𝑊
+ and the sum of the ranks with the 
negative 𝑑𝑖, 𝑊
− 
5. Test the statistic 𝑊 = min (𝑊+, 𝑊−) against the Wilcoxon critical values. 
 
For the long-term strategy evaluation, the formed portfolios are backtested from 01/2016 
to 08/2020 systematically. In practice, the strategy is treated as it was utilized 
continuously from 2016 onwards. The obvious caveat with the selloff event clustering, 
i.e., a situation where several portfolios returns overlap, makes the perceived effects from 
the original events unreliable. Lyon, Barber & Tsai (1999) discuss the impact of 
overlapping event returns in their study and find the only solution to counter the cross-
sectional dependence of the sample is to remove the overlapping observations. 
 
To enhance the real-world functionality and minimize the cross-correlation problems in 
the sample, the overlapping event portfolios are treated so that the next event portfolio is 
only started after the previous has ended. This is the method Lyon et al. (1999) suggested 
to control for the cross-sectional dependence. This decreases event clustering and 
increases the significance of the statistical methods used. As the time-structure (Lynch et 
al. 2019) found for the cumulative average abnormal returns in their paper was consistent 
towards the end, starting the strategy between the 40 day holding period should not cause 
limitations to the overall returns. 
 
As the nature of this study differs slightly from traditional event studies, no clearly correct 
way of estimating long-term returns can be immediately motivated. Most of the existing 
literature debate between buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) and the calendar time 
portfolios (CTP), which both have their caveats. (Fama 1998) argue for using either short-
term abnormal returns (AARs and CARs) or the CTP method for preventing a cross-
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correlation problem in the returns. In this paper, CTP is used in combination with the 
Fama-French 5-factor model to estimate long-run abnormal returns.  
 
As the sample initially uses daily returns to create short-term portfolios in the first section, 
Calendar-time portfolios are daily equally weighted instead of monthly. Furthermore, the 
nature of this study prevents estimating similarly different holding periods per event 
induced, as in traditional event studies, since each “event” is used as a trigger to create a 
unique portfolio that is sold after 40 days. Thus, this long-term strategy section does not 
repeat the analysis of the first 40-day abnormal return section but focuses on the 
performance of the strategy if it was systematically reproduced for the duration of the 
whole sample. For the analysis of the long-term strategy, the second hypothesis was 
formed: 
 
H2: The low beta-to-ETF strategy generates statistically significant abnormal returns as 
a long-term systematic strategy. 
 
Thus, for the second hypothesis, raw buy-and-hold returns and Sharpe ratios for both the 
ETF and the strategy are presented. Then, the excess returns of the ETF strategies are 
estimated by the Fama-French 5 factor model, but with a supplemental measure to 
investigate the usefulness of the beta-to-ETF. 
 
Frazzini & Pedersen (2014) find that high beta assets are generally associated with low 
alpha. Authors then constructed portfolios that long low-beta securities and short-sell 
securities with high beta, which produces significant positive returns. The Betting-
against-beta or BAB factor is interesting as this paper takes a somewhat similar approach 
with the difference of equity betas being calculated by their parent ETF. However, 
especially for broad-index funds, the estimated “betas-to-ETF” are equivalent to 
traditional beta estimates for these stocks. 
 
Another key difference between the BAB factor and low beta-to-ETF strategy is that this 
strategy does not take the opposite, short-sell bet for high beta-to-ETF stocks. As Lynch 
et al. (2019) disregard this as the point of the strategy is to capture the outsider stocks that 
are less sensitive towards the index, or in this instance, ETF, they are part of. The BAB 
betas are estimated by the formula (23) with a 1-year rolling standard deviation for 
volatilities with a five-year correlation estimate. One-day log-returns are used to estimate 
volatilities, and three-day log-returns are used with correlations to control for non-
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synchronous trading. Additionally, time-series estimates for the betas are shrunk towards 
the cross-sectional mean (𝛽𝑋𝑆) by: 
 
(23) 𝛽 = 𝑤𝛽
𝑇𝑆 + (1 − 𝑤)𝛽𝑋𝑆 
 
 
where: 𝛽𝑇𝑆 = Time-series estimates for the betas 
 𝛽𝑋𝑆 = Cross-sectional means of the betas 
w = weight that is set at 0.6 
 
BAB portfolios are then constructed by going long to low-beta securities and shorting 
high beta securities. Aggregate country/region portfolios are then weighted by the 
region’s total lagged market capitalization. Estimated betas are ranked and assigned to 
low beta and high beta categories. The portfolios are rebalanced by every calendar month 
as to where 𝑧 = 𝑛 x 1 is a vector of beta ranks 𝑧 = 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝛽) at the portfolio formation, 
and  𝑧̅ =  1𝑛
′ 𝑧/𝑛 is the average rank, where n is the number of securities and the 1𝑛 is an 
𝑛 x 1 vector of ones. 
 
The portfolio weights of the high beta and low beta portfolios are given by 𝑤𝐻 =
𝑘(𝑧 − 𝑧̅)+ and 𝑤𝐿 = 𝑘(𝑧 − 𝑧̅)
−, where k functions as a normalizing constant 𝑘−1 =
1𝑛
′ |𝑧 − 𝑧̅|/2 and 𝑥+ and 𝑥− are the positive and negative elements of the vector x. To 
construct the BAB factor, the acquired high and low portfolios are rescaled to beta 1 at 
the time of the formation. As the BAB factor short sells and longs simultaneously, it is a 


















𝐿  = 𝑟𝑡+1
′ 𝑤𝐿 
 𝑟𝑡+1









For this paper, the BAB factors are obtained from the AQR Capital Management’s (AQR 
2020) dataset library, which provides the BAB factors for US, European and Global 
equities. To ensure the usefulness of the BAB factor, correlations between traditional FF5 
model factors are presented: 
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CROSS-CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE FF5 + BAB FACTORS 
  Mkt-RF SMB HML RMW CMA BAB 
Mkt-RF 1           
SMB 0.22 1         
HML 0.20 0.35 1       
RMW -0.03 -0.07 0.19 1     
CMA -0.19 -0.02 0.47 0.12 1   
BAB 0.00 -0.28 -0.25 -0.02 -0.04 1 
              
Notes: Correlations between factors are calculated from the sample period 01/2016 to 
08/2020 and Fama-French 2x3 US factors. 
 
 
Table 4. Cross-correlations between the FF5 + BAB factors. 
 
As seen in Table 4, the correlations follow mostly the pattern of (Fama & French, 2015) 
apart from the HML factor with small positive correlations with the Mkt-RF and SMB 
factors, which were -0.30 and -0.11 respectively, in the original study. The inspected BAB 
factor correlates as a zero-beta market portfolio, as clarified earlier. Additionally, the 
correlations with the other factors are either negative or close to zero, ensuring that the 
BAB factor provides unique uncorrelated information to the model. 
 
To further show that BAB is a useful addition to the FF5 model for this sample, a right-
hand side test is used to prove that the other factors do not span the factor. If the BAB 
factor adds to the explanatory power of the FF5 model, BAB returns for the sample period 
are regressed against the other FF5 factors. If the spanning regression yields a nonzero, 
statistically significant intercept, the factor adds to the model's explanatory power for this 
sample period (Fama & French 2018). In the following table, the spanning regression for 










BAB FACTOR SPANNING REGRESSION FOR FF5 FACTORS 
  α Mkt-RF SMB HML RMW CMA R² 
BAB US 0.0003*** -0.19*** 0.01 -0.38*** 0.32*** 0.57*** 0.35 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.74) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
BAB EU 0.0003** -0.16*** 0.41*** -0.12 0.00 0.21** 0.19 
  (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.99) (0.03)   
BAB INTL 0.0002* -0.17*** -0.26*** -0.18*** 0.26*** 0.07 0.27 
  (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16)   
Notes: BAB US, Europe, and International factors are regressed against the Fama-French factors for four 
years, from 01/2016 to 01/2020. P-values are in parentheses. 
*** Denotes two-tailed significance at the 1% level. 
** Denotes two-tailed significance at the 5% level. 
* Denotes two-tailed significance at the 10% level. 
 
Table 5. BAB factor spanning regression for FF5 factors. 
 
The results in Table 5 show that all the intercepts obtained are nonzero, although 
relatively close to zero, and statistically significant at least on the 10% level. Therefore, 
adding the BAB factor to the FF5 is useful for the model's full explanatory power. Thus, 
the FF5 model is expanded with the BAB factor to further capture the long-term abnormal 
return and the sensitivity of this low beta-to-ETF strategy to this factor. To prove the 
second hypothesis set in this thesis, the strategies should yield positive alpha by these 
measures. 
 
Finally, the last area of interest in this paper is the usefulness of the fundamental proxy 
for the low beta-to-ETF strategy. As described earlier, Piotroski F-Score is used as a 
proxy to model discretionary, fundamental analysis, and forms the third hypothesis was 
stated as follows: 
 
H3: The fundamental proxy provides better, statistically significant abnormal returns for 
low beta-to-ETF portfolios after high volume ETF selloffs. 
 
For the usability of the fundamental proxy, 1-40 day low beta-to-ETF portfolios are 
weighted with calculated F-Score for each stock, instead of fund holding value or equal 
weighting. To fulfill the third hypothesis, abnormal returns of the 1-40 day strategy should 
prove to increase with fundamental sorting. As the Piotroski F-Score requires past 
financial statement information about the portfolio companies, four variables are created 
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for the ORBIS database to efficiently fetch this information. The used variables can be 
found in the Appendix 8. 
 
The F-Score is measured for each stock at the time of the portfolio creation date by 
looking at the last annual statement during that period. This restriction is made to combat 
the significant look-ahead bias that would otherwise arise. For instance, if the portfolio 
was created on 01/2020, the latest annual report available at the time was not the 2019 
report, but the 2018 report as the preparation of the 2019 financial statement was in 
progress. Thus, there can be significant lag with the fundamental component for specific 
portfolios, which is typical for any financial ratios that require comprehensive annual 
statement-based data (Breitschwerdt 2015).   
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
In this section, the performance and properties of the created strategy portfolios are 
analyzed. First, following the methodology of Lynch et al. (2019), proof of constituent 
cross-correlations during abnormal volume periods in the sample are presented. Secondly, 
the acquired portfolio cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) are estimated by 
the periods of selloff day t+5, t+10, t+20, and t+40 to gather whether there is a consistent 
time structure behind the portfolio abnormal returns. Following this, the strategy is 
applied in a systematic, long-term fashion, and the annualized returns of the selected ETFs 
and implemented strategies are analyzed with conventional portfolio evaluation metrics. 
 
Next, the long-term strategies are estimated with the Fama-French 5-factor model to 
determine the abnormal returns generated by the strategies. The factor model is applied 
with and without the BAB factor expansion introduced earlier to assess whether actual 
abnormal returns can be captured long-term. Finally, the usefulness of the fundamental 
proxy suggested is tested by comparing the returns of the traditional portfolio weighting 
methods against the fundamentally weighted alternative. 
 
 
5.1. Evaluation of the short-term strategy 
 
By examining selected ETF constituent behavior during the ETF abnormal volume days, 
a similar pattern to Lynch et al. (2019) can be captured by the broad index funds. 
However, the funds with a fundamental stock selection criterion seem to have a slight 
inverse factor on the constituent correlations after an ETF volume spike. Mainly funds 
QUAL, SUAS and IESG showed, on the one hand, heightened constituent correlations, 
but also, on the other hand, substantial negative correlations between some constituents. 
Thus, averaging the overall cross-constituent correlations towards zero. 
 
Cross-constituent correlations (𝜌) for ETF constituent stocks are calculated as follows: 
 
(25) 𝜌 = 𝑓(𝑥) = {
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑥, 𝑦), 𝐴𝑙𝑙




Where x and y are respectively the time series of daily returns for two ETF constituents, 
and Z is the Z-score of daily ETF trading volume. The Z-score is calculated by the 
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methods of formulas (15) and (16). Average cross-constituent correlations from 01/2019 
to 08/2020 are as follows: 
 
 
As seen in Graph 7, most of the selected ETF constituents follow the pattern identified 
by (Da & Shive 2018; Lynch et al. 2019). Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, ETF 
constituents with fundamental selection criteria did not experience a unified pattern in 
cross-constituent correlations. Thus, for the funds QUAL, SUAS and IESG, the cross-
correlations averaged towards zero for the abnormal volume days. This inverse 
relationship is curious and suggests that some stocks in these thematical funds could 
possess flight-to-safety attributes in terms of abrupt market sentiment changes. For 
example, stocks that emphasize corporate social responsibility have been found to be less 
sensitive to crash risk (Kim, Li & Li 2014). 
 
Next, the CAARs acquired for each ETF by incorporating the low beta-to-ETF strategy 
are presented. The CAARs are calculated from the generated event portfolios with the 
methods introduced in formulas (19), (20), and (21). The sample period is 01/2016 – 
08/2020 to provide convenient continuity to the Lynch et al. (2019), who investigated the 
alphas for U.S.-based SPDRs from 2010 to 2017. In the first table, results of the equally 
weighted outsider stock portfolios are shown: 
 











IVV QUAL ISF EXS1 SXRT SUAS IESG IH2O
Average cross-constituent correlations 01/2019 - 08/2020
All Abnormal volume days




Days after volume spike t 
  t+5 t+10 t+20 t+40 
          
IVV -0.003 -0.006 -0.011 0.000 
  (0.54) (0.16) (0.50) (0.79) 
QUAL -0.001 0.006 -0.003 0.007 
  (0.97) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) 
ISF -0.001 0.003 0.008 0.026** 
  (0.51) (0.87) (0.12) (0.01) 
EXS1 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.008 
  (0.95) (0.95) (0.75) (0.44) 
SXRT 0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.007 
  (0.76) (0.97) (0.73) (0.55) 
SUAS 0.014** 0.015** 0.019** 0.024** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
IESG 0.000 0.004 0.009 0.015 
  (0.41) (0.46) (0.26) (0.13) 
IH2O -0.008 -0.016 -0.008 -0.003 
  (0.26) (0.12) (0.43) (0.34) 
Notes: This table presents the CAARs for each selected ETF by the periods of t+5, t+10, t+20 and t+40, t being 
the abnormal ETF volume event. The ETF-beta estimation period starts from 01/2015 and the full sample 
consists of 01/2016 - 08/2020. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicates significance levels of 0.05 (**) and 0.01 
(***). Please see table 1 for ETF symbol explanations. 
Table 6. Cumulative average abnormal returns for outsider portfolios created after ETF selloff day, Equal 
weighted. 
 
Similarly to Lynch et al. (2019) paper, some evidence of abnormal returns obtained from 
the strategy can be captured. Especially the funds ISF and SUAS presented statistically 
significant 2.6% (p = 0.01) and 2.4% (p = 0.02) CAARs after 40 days, p-values in 
parentheses. However, similarly consistent and significant abnormal return patterns that 
Lynch et al. (2019) found could not be confirmed immediately. In their paper, authors 
found that approximately after t+5, most investigated funds produced already positive 
CAARs. At the t+40, most of the CAARs ranged from 2% to over 7%, while most being 
statistically significant. 
 
Especially the control group fund IVV produced disappointing returns. The time-structure 
of the returns was mostly negative and ended up to zero at the t+40. Even though total 
CAARs were positive for most of the funds, apart from the fund IH2O, the significance 
of the returns could not be verified by the statistical methods used. For Table 7, portfolio 
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weighting methods are changed from Lynch et al. (2019) used equal weighting to value 
weighting by proportional constituent weights in ETF. 
 
         
VALUE WEIGHTING 
Days after volume spike t 
  t+5 t+10 t+20 t+40 
          
IVV -0.001 -0.004 -0.010 0.004 
  (0.89) (0.46) (0.53) (0.35) 
QUAL -0.001 0.007 -0.002 0.009 
  (0.99) (0.14) (0.40) (0.20) 
ISF 0.002 0.007 0.013** 0.028*** 
  (0.91) (0.44) (0.04) (0.00) 
EXS1 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.009 
  (0.99) (0.79) (0.66) (0.35) 
SXRT 0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.010 
  (0.48) (0.88) (0.65) (0.31) 
SUAS 0.013** 0.015** 0.018** 0.025** 
  (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
IESG -0.003 0.004 0.007 0.007 
  (0.53) (0.48) (0.48) (0.24) 
IH2O -0.003 -0.008 0.008 0.012** 
  (0.40) (0.26) (0.07) (0.03) 
Notes: This table presents the CAARs for each selected ETF by the periods of t+5, t+10, t+20, and t+40, t being 
the abnormal ETF volume event. The ETF-beta estimation period starts from 01/2015, and the full sample 
consists of 01/2016 - 08/2020. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicates significance levels of 0.05 (**) and 0.01 
(***). Please see table 1 for ETF symbol explanations. 
Table 7. Cumulative average abnormal returns for outsider portfolios created after ETF selloff day, Value 
weighted. 
 
The results captured here follow the pattern of Table 6 with the difference that most of 
the p-values of the results strengthened, albeit most of them still being insignificant. 
Similarly, to Table 6 ISF and SUAS produced the highest CAARs after 40 days, 2.8% (p 
= 0.00) and 2.5% (p = 0.03) respectively. Additionally, the fund IH2O produced a 
significant 1.2% (p = 0.03) return, an absolute increase of 1.5% from the equally weighted 
alternative -0.3% (p = 0.34). As seen, the value-weighting method proves superior here 
with this sample and will be used as the baseline in the following long-term performance 
evaluation sections. The idea of higher stock volatility due to higher ETF ownership (Ben-
David et al. 2018) may have some basis here, as the largest owners of the selected outsider 
stocks were almost unanimously asset management companies. 
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However, as mentioned earlier, overweighting single stocks in this outsider strategy is 
not an unwanted attribute and can even capture the ETF induced constituent co-movement 
better. Even the control group ETF IVV experiences enhanced returns from the value 
weighting with 0.4% (p = 0.35) positive CAAR at t+40. Overall, the CAAR time-structure 
is smoother and ends up positive for every ETF inspected. By plotting the value-weighted 




As briefly discussed earlier, the 2020 February-March COVID-19 related market crash is 
a complicating factor when comparing these results to (Lynch et al., 2019), as during their 
















































































































































Value weighted CAARs t+40
Graph 8. T+5 and T+10 CAARs for each ETF strategy, Value weighted. Significance levels of 0.05 are 
denoted by (**) and 0.01 by (***). 
Graph 9. T+20 and T+40 CAARs for each ETF strategy, Value weighted. Significance levels of 0.05 are 
denoted by (**) and 0.01 by (***). 
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significant full economy-wide market crashes occurred apart from the European debt 
crisis in 2011, that had limited effects to the U.S. markets in its entirety. To counter this 
disparity, a COVID-19 adjustment for the portfolios is made for backtesting purposes. In 
this adjustment, all the selloff events happened between February – March 2020 are 
omitted, in combination with the value-weighted portfolios, to produce striking results: 
         
COVID-19 ADJUSTED 
VALUE WEIGHTING 
Days after volume spike t 
  t+5 t+10 t+20 t+40 
IVV 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.009 
  (0.64) (0.92) (0.73) (0.10) 
QUAL 0.001 0.008** 0.006 0.012** 
  (0.36) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) 
ISF 0.004 0.009 0.016*** 0.025*** 
  (0.22) (0.10) (0.01) (0.00) 
EXS1 0.004 0.007 0.009 0.016 
  (0.26) (0.15) (0.12) (0.07) 
SXRT 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.009 
  (0.29) (0.23) (0.17) (0.14) 
SUAS 0.008** 0.012** 0.016*** 0.023** 
  (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
IESG -0.004 -0.001 0.003 0.010 
  (0.16) (0.28) (0.31) (0.20) 
IH2O 0.000 0.000 0.014** 0.013** 
  (0.48) (0.49) (0.02) (0.03) 
Notes: This table presents the CAARs for each selected ETF by the periods of t+5, t+10, t+20 and t+40, t being 
the abnormal ETF volume event. The ETF-beta estimation period starts from 01/2015 and the full sample 
consists of 01/2016 - 08/2020. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicates significance levels of 0.05 (**) and 0.01 




Table 8. Cumulative average abnormal returns for outsider portfolios created after ETF selloff day, 
COVID-19 adjusted, Value weighted. 
 
By adjusting to the February - March COVID-19 related market turmoil, the CAARs of 
the strategy are strengthened significantly. Following the earlier two Tables 6 and 7, ISF 
and SUAS still produce the most impressing CAARs, 2.5% (p = 0.00) and 2.3% (p = 
0.03) respectively after 40 days. However, two additional funds experience statistically 
significant CAARs as QUAL and IH2O show CAARs of 1.2% (p = 0.05) and 1.3% (p = 
0.03). Additionally, IVV with 0.9% (p = 0.10) and EXS1 1.6% (p = 0.07) are just shy of 
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being statistically significant on the 0.05 level. Overall, all the p-values decrease greatly 
towards statistical significance, and acquired CAARs are improved. 
Thus, the acquired results imply that the outsider strategy is still functional but does not 
bring protection or superior returns in terms of whole market-wide risk-off scenarios 
experienced in February – March 2020.  Again, by plotting these value-weighted CAARs 















































































































COVID-19 adjusted value weighted 
CAARs t+20



































COVID-19 adjusted value weighted 
CAARs t+40
Graph 10. T+5 and T+10 CAARs for each ETF strategy, COVID-19 adjusted, Value weighted. 
Significance levels of 0.05 are denoted by (**) and 0.01 by (***). 
Graph 11. T+5 and T+10 CAARs for each ETF strategy, COVID-19 adjusted, Value weighted. 
Significance levels of 0.05 are denoted by (**) and 0.01 by (***). 
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As mentioned, the overall time structure of CAARs is enhanced, and the significance of 
the acquired results is much improved. All the eight selected ETFs produced positive 
CAARs after 40 days with the COVID-19 adjustment. Funds ISF, EXS1, SXRT, and 
SUAS generated the most consistently positive returns starting from t+5. The control 
group fund IVV is still slightly disappointing compared to the CAARs Lynch et al. (2019) 
acquired (6% after 40 days, statistically significant by 0.01 level). However, different 
time-period for the sample that the fact that IVV and SPY trading volume patterns are not 
identical impacted the results. 
 
Finally, for the short term CAAR analysis, value-weighted portfolio returns with and 
without the COVID-19 adjustment are plotted in a graph illustrating the average CAARs 
acquired for the whole sample: 
 
 
As Graph 12 illustrates, COVID-19 adjustment generates superior, more consistent 
returns sample-wide. The average CAAR received in the sample is 1.3% after 40 days, 
and with the COVID-19 adjustment, 1.43%. Even though by absolute means, the 
difference is just 0.13%, the overall improved statistical significance of the COVID-19 
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previous studies. Overall, the amount of statistically significant findings with the value-
weighted portfolios were similar to the Lynch et al. (2019) equal-weighted findings, who 
found 5 of the total 11 CAARs to be statistically significant at the end of the 40 days. 
However, when comparing the magnitude of figures obtained to the previous Lynch et al. 
(2019) paper, it is essential to consider that the qualities of the sample used in this paper 
differed not only regionally but with smaller median AUM and lower trading volumes. 
Thus, it can be expected that the CAARs captured may not be as aggressive as with larger 
funds with higher trading volumes. After all, the positive CAARs obtained in this paper 
further confirm the low beta-to-ETF metric’s usefulness combined with ETF selloffs as a 
universal trading rule to consider. In the next section, the strategy is adapted for 
systematic long-term practice and measured against traditional asset pricing models. 
 
 
5.2. Evaluation of the long-term strategies 
 
For the long-term strategies, the non-adjusted value-weighted 40-day portfolio holding 
periods are used and backtested consistently from 01/2016 to 08/2020. The strategies 
include the same low beta-to-ETF portfolio creation process, but the non-event periods 
are filled with either the return of the parent ETF or the risk-free rate. The first strategy 
with ETF ownership between the event dates shows the performance opportunity present 
with the low beta-to-ETF strategy compared to just passively holding the ETF. However, 
the risk-free return strategy dismisses owning the parent ETF and demonstrates the raw 
return acquired from the outsider stock-picking strategy. 
 
First, descriptive statistics of the selected ETFs and the strategies incorporated are 
presented, and in the table, average annual returns, standard deviations, and Sharpe ratios 
are presented for the parent ETF, denoted as the “X ETF” where X indicates the ETF 
ticker in question. The first strategy, where the non-event period days are filled with the 
return of the parent ETF, is denoted as the (“X Strategy”), where X indicates the ETF 
ticker in question and finally, the second strategy with non-event period days filled with 
the risk-free rate is denoted as (“X RF Strategy”), where the X indicates the ETF ticker 
















Stdev Sharpe Ratio #Obs 
IVV ETF 10.80 % 0.195 0.55 1155 
IVV STRATEGY 10.64 % 0.184 0.58 1155 
IVV RF STRATEGY 9.20 % 0.162 0.57 1155 
          
QUAL ETF 10.17 % 0.191 0.53 1155 
QUAL STRATEGY 10.54 % 0.180 0.58 1155 
QUAL RF STRATEGY 6.46 % 0.164 0.39 1155 
          
ISF ETF -4.25 % 0.209 -0.20 1159 
ISF STRATEGY 8.40 % 0.153 0.55 1159 
ISF RF STRATEGY 7.31 % 0.130 0.56 1159 
          
EXS1 ETF 3.45 % 0.211 0.16 1160 
EXS1 STRATEGY 6.09 % 0.185 0.33 1160 
EXS1 RF STRATEGY 4.79 % 0.144 0.33 1160 
          
SXRT ETF 3.92 % 0.205 0.19 1174 
SXRT STRATEGY 5.78 % 0.183 0.32 1174 
SXRT RF STRATEGY 6.19 % 0.117 0.53 1174 
          
SUAS ETF 15.66 % 0.170 0.92 1023 
SUAS STRATEGY 12.91 % 0.181 0.71 1023 
SUAS RF STRATEGY 4.34 % 0.142 0.30 1023 
          
IESG ETF 6.71 % 0.178 0.38 1184 
IESG STRATEGY 7.95 % 0.178 0.45 1184 
IESG RF STRATEGY -1.67 % 0.111 -0.15 1184 
          
IH2O ETF 8.29 % 0.171 0.49 1194 
IH2O STRATEGY 10.43 % 0.180 0.58 1194 
IH2O RF STRATEGY 5.84 % 0.151 0.39 1194 
         
Notes: This table presents the raw returns from just holding the investigated ETF and two different strategy 
scenarios where in "ETF STRATEGY" the ETF is held in between the event dates, and in "ETF RF 
STRATEGY" only risk-free rate is received in between the event dates. Please see table 1 for ETF symbol 
explanations. Sharpe ratios and annual returns for strategies are bolded when they exceed the parent ETF annual 




Table 9. Descriptive long-term strategy returns. 
 
Examining the most conventional portfolio performance evaluation metrics, utilizing the 
low beta-to-ETF strategies has a positive effect against the parent ETF returns. By 
combining the passive ETF ownership with the active strategy of buying outsider 
constituents after ETF selloff days, investors receive superior returns by absolute measure 
for the QUAL, ISF, EXS1, SXRT, IESG, and IH2O funds. For the rest of the funds, most 
of the relative return underperformance is countered with increasing Sharpe ratios, as only 
the SUAS ETF Strategies underperform the parent ETF by all measures. However, the 
underperformance could be partially explained by the relative lack of total selloff dates 
captured for the SUAS ETF. 
 
As SUAS and IESG ETFs experienced the least amount of selloff days, their RF 
Strategies underperform most against the parent ETFs, as the number of days where the 
risk-free, or in practice, zero-rate is received increases significantly. For the other ETFs, 
the RF Strategy significantly lowers the standard deviation of the returns compared to the 
parent ETFs and the ETF Strategy, as expected. The following graphs will illustrate the 
best performing long-term strategies. All the graphs from the strategies can be found at 














ISF ETF cumulative returns 01/2016 - 08/2020
ISF ISF STRATEGY RF STRATEGY





As seen in Graph 13, both strategies overperform against the FTSE 100 following ISF 
ETF almost the entire sample period, and most of the overperformance was gained during 
the UK Brexit vote in the summer of 2016. It seems to be that for that specific event, 
being invested in low beta-to-ETF stocks in the UK region proved to be a useful hedge 
against the Brexit-induced market turmoil in the UK. Next, the DAX 30 tracking EXS1 
ETF is analyzed: 
 
As Graph 14 shows, the EXS1, or DAX 30 index following ETF strategy returns, show 
superior performance against the parent ETF. Especially the RF Strategy overperforms 
the ETF Strategy and the parent ETF to the February – March 2020 COVID-19 crash, but 
in the recovery phase, the ETF Strategy passes it.  
 
As a mandatory caveat, it must be stated that performing these outsider strategies in real 
markets would require active rebalancing with the created event portfolios and the parent 
ETF, which would accumulate the transaction costs significantly. However, these costs 
are difficult to quantify as the switches between the event portfolio’s contents can be 
major or minor. Especially for the ETFs with consistently occurring selloff days, it is 












EXS1 ETF cumulative returns 01/2016 - 08/2020
EXS1 EXS1 STRATEGY RF STRATEGY
Graph 14. Cumulative returns for the EXS1 ETF, from 01/2016 to 08/2020. 
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sold and repurchased after the next event, are needed. Table 10 shows the excess returns 
for the strategy with the ETF ownership between the event dates: 
EXCESS RETURNS FOR THE ETF STRATEGY (FF5 + BAB) 
  α βMKT βSMB βHML βRMW βCMA βBAB df R² 
IVV 
STRATEGY 
0.0001 0.66*** -0.03 0.09** 0.24*** 0.27*** 0.33*** 1155 0.56 
(0.72) (0.00) (0.44) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
  0.0001 0.69*** -0.12*** 0.02 0.25*** 0.33***   1155 0.52 
  (0.65) (0.00) (0.00) (0.65) (0.00) (0.00)       
QUAL 
STRATEGY 
0.0000 0.79*** -0.08** -0.02 0.31*** 0.47*** 0.32*** 1155 0.76 
(0.86) (0.00) (0.01) (0.40) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
  0.0000 0.82*** -0.17*** -0.09*** 0.32*** 0.53***   1155 0.72 
  (0.98) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
ISF 
STRATEGY 
0.0002 0.50*** -0.51*** -0.50*** 0.21* 0.47*** -0.05 1159 0.45 
(0.26) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.15)     
  0.0002 0.50*** -0.53*** -0.49*** 0.22** 0.46***   1159 0.45 
  (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00)       
EXS1 
STRATEGY 
0.0002 0.46*** -0.13 -0.11 0.10 -0.27* -0.21*** 1160 0.26 
(0.45) (0.00) (0.11) (0.33) (0.52) (0.08) (0.00)     
  0.0001 0.49*** -0.23*** -0.05 0.14 -0.30*   1160 0.25 
  (0.62) (0.00) (0.01) (0.66) (0.39) (0.05)       
SXRT 
STRATEGY 
0.0001 0.75*** -0.79*** -0.29*** -0.17* 0.13 -0.06** 1174 0.77 
(0.38) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.13) (0.02)     
  0.0001 0.76*** -0.82*** -0.27*** -0.16* 0.12   1174 0.77 
  (0.46) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.16)       
SUAS 
STRATEGY 
0.0001 0.72*** -0.09** -0.08** 0.13** 0.66*** 0.34*** 1022 0.67 
(0.54) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)     
  0.0002 0.75*** -0.17*** -0.15*** 0.11* 0.73***   1022 0.62 
  (0.48) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00)       
IESG 
STRATEGY 
0.0002 0.63*** -0.36*** -0.64*** -0.16 0.58*** 0.00 1184 0.52 
(0.35) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.91)     
  0.0002 0.63*** -0.36*** -0.64*** -0.16 0.58***   1184 0.52 
  (0.35) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00)       
IH2O 
STRATEGY 
0.0001 0.79*** 0.12* 0.01 0.32** 0.39** 0.30*** 1194 0.39 
(0.62) (0.00) (0.09) (0.91) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)     
  0.0002 0.94*** 0.45*** -0.12* 0.08 0.79***   1194 0.58 
  (0.39) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.43) (0.00)       
Notes: Excess return of the strategy is regressed on Fama-French five factor model as follows: Rpi-
Rfi=αp+β(p,MKT)*(RmiRfi)+β(p,SMB)*SMB+β(p,HML)*HML+β(p,RMW)*RMW+ 
β(p,CMA)*CMA+εp, where Rpi is the value-weighted combined event portfolio or parent ETF return on day i, 
Rfi is the 1-month T-bill rate converted to daily rate, Rmi is the market return on day i. The intercept α measures 
the average daily abnormal return of the strategy.P-values are in parentheses. FF5 daily factors are used for IVV, 
QUAL and SUAS. FF5 European daily factors are used for ISF, EXS1, SXRT and IESG. FF5 developed daily 
factors are used for IH2O. Please see table 1 for ETF symbol explanations. *** Denotes two-tailed significance 






Table 10. Excess returns for the ETF Strategy, estimated with FF5 (+BAB). 
By interpreting the results obtained, one can immediately notice that not a single ETF 
Strategy provided statistically significant alpha by the FF5 and FF5+BAB models for the 
sample period. However, all strategies provided positive alpha by sign, but not by 
statistical measures when the low beta-to-ETF strategy was implemented. Primarily the 
ISF Strategy provided 2bps (p = 0.26) daily alpha, which still missed fairly the barrier of 
10% significance. Thus, the absolute alpha generating ability of the ETF Strategy cannot 
be confirmed by the FF5 + BAB estimates. 
 
Furthermore, as the strategy returns deviate from the parent ETF returns, the sensitivity 
to the MKT factor deviates from one with all the strategies. One additional interesting 
detail to cover is that the strategies often take, large negative position against the SMB 
factor. The negative SMB loading is magnified for most of the strategies, apart from the 
IH2O strategy. This is explained that most of the funds examined in this paper are either 
broad-index or fundamental factor funds with a slight bias towards large-cap stocks. For 
the IH2O, most of the constituents are either mid or small-cap infrastructure stocks. 
However, it is curious that the low beta-to-ETF strategy further magnifies this bias in 
most cases, implying the outsider stocks in these ETFs tend to be larger in general. 
 
For US and International ETFs, IVV, QUAL, SUAS, and IH2O, strategies are positively 
sensitive towards the BAB factor with statistical significance on the 1% level. As the low 
beta-to-ETF strategy does not take the opposite short high beta stocks approach, factor 
loadings closer to 1 were not expected. The fact why the European-based funds ISF, 
EXS1, SXRT, and IESG experienced either negative or close to zero loadings for the 
BAB factor can be explained by the lack of country-specific BAB factors used in this 
thesis.  
 
Finally, Table 11 presents excess returns of the low beta-to-ETF strategy combined with 












EXCESS RETURNS FOR THE RF STRATEGY (FF5 + BAB) 
  α βMKT βSMB βHML βRMW βCMA βBAB df R² 
IVV RF 
STRATEGY 
0.0001 0.54*** -0.04 0.07** 0.19*** 0.26*** 0.46*** 1155 0.49 
(0.80) (0.00) (0.33) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
  0.0001 0.57*** -0.16*** -0.03 0.20*** 0.34***   1155 0.40 
  (0.71) (0.00) (0.00) (0.51) (0.00) (0.00)       
QUAL RF 
STRATEGY 
-0.0001 0.65*** -0.11*** 0.00 0.29*** 0.46*** 0.38*** 1155 0.66 
(0.51) (0.00) (0.00) (0.89) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
  -0.0001 0.67*** -0.21*** -0.08** 0.29*** 0.53***   1155 0.59 
  (0.65) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)       
ISF RF 
STRATEGY 
0.0002 0.35*** -0.39*** -0.44*** 0.26** 0.41*** -0.07** 1159 0.35 
(0.27) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04)     
  0.0002 0.36*** -0.42*** -0.42*** 0.27** 0.40***   1159 0.34 
  (0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)       
EXS1 RF 
STRATEGY 
0.0002 0.25*** 0.10 -0.28*** -0.11 -0.08 -0.11** 1160 0.09 
(0.53) (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.41) (0.54) (0.01)     
  0.0001 0.26*** 0.05 -0.25** -0.10 -0.10   1160 0.09 
  (0.64) (0.00) (0.46) (0.01) (0.49) (0.46)       
SXRT RF 
STRATEGY 
0.0002 0.39*** -0.38*** -0.41*** 0.11 0.59*** -0.09*** 1174 0.43 
(0.24) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.24) (0.00) (0.00)     
  0.0002 0.40*** -0.42*** -0.38*** 0.13 0.57***   1174 0.43 
  (0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.00)       
SUAS RF 
STRATEGY 
-0.0001 0.59*** -0.11*** -0.04 0.10* 0.54*** 0.43*** 1022 0.65 
(0.42) (0.00) (0.00) (0.22) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)     
  -0.0001 0.63*** -0.21*** -0.13*** 0.07 0.63***   1022 0.55 
  (0.59) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.21) (0.00)       
IESG RF 
STRATEGY 
-0.0001 0.37*** -0.09* -0.55*** -0.06 0.52*** -0.04 1184 0.28 
(0.44) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.56) (0.00) (0.21)     
  -0.0002 0.37*** -0.11** -0.53*** -0.05 0.52***   1184 0.28 
  (0.39) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.60) (0.00)       
IH2O RF 
STRATEGY 
0.0000 0.58*** 0.10 0.06 0.36*** 0.33** 0.46*** 1194 0.38 
(0.88) (0.00) (0.13) (0.48) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)     
  0.0002 0.79*** 0.14* -0.16* 0.37*** 0.62***   1194 0.38 
  (0.48) (0.00) (0.05) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00)       
Notes: Excess return of the strategy is regressed on Fama-French five factor model as follows: Rpi-
Rfi=αp+β(p,MKT)*(RmiRfi)+β(p,SMB)*SMB+β(p,HML)*HML+β(p,RMW)*RMW+ 
β(p,CMA)*CMA+εp, where Rpi si the value-weighted combined event portfolio or risk-free return on day i, Rfi 
is the 1-month T-bill rate converted to daily rate, Rmi is the market return on day i. The intercept α measures the 
average daily abnormal return of the strategy. FF5 daily factors are used for IVV, QUAL and SUAS. FF5 
European daily factors are used for ISF, EXS1, SXRT and IESG. FF5 developed daily factors are used for IH2O. 
P-values are in parentheses. Please see table 1 for ETF symbol explanations. *** Denotes two-tailed significance 






Table 11. Excess returns for the ETF RF Strategy, estimated with FF5 (+BAB). 
Similar to the previous strategy results, the RF Strategy provides no statistically 
significant alpha for any of the ETFs. However, in comparison to the ETF Strategy alphas, 
QUAL, SUAS and IESG fail to produce a positive sign for the alpha estimate, but as with 
all the previous intercepts, none of these are statistically significant. ISF and EXS1 
provide statistically insignificant 2bps (p = 0.27) and 2bps (p = 0.53) of daily alpha. These 
results do not differ notably from the earlier ETF Strategy implemented. 
 
As expected, the MKT factor loadings further decrease, as the ETF RF Strategy 
incorporates the risk-free return in between the event periods instead of equity (ETF) 
return. Like the previous strategy with the added ETF ownership, most of the RF 
Strategies take positive loadings for the CMA factor. BAB factor is again relatively large 
and statistically significant at the 1% level for the U.S.-based IVV, QUAL, and SUAS 
ETFs. 
 
Overall, both strategies failed to produce statistically significant alpha with the FF5 
estimation or the FF5 + BAB factor expansion. Thus, it is justified to reject the second 
hypothesis as statistically significant abnormal returns could not be captured long term. 
As a caveat, however, Lynch et al. (2019) paper investigated the amount of alpha “left on 
the table” by passive investors. Thus, this low beta-to-ETF strategy is not necessarily 
tailored to produce absolute alpha but to overperform relative to their parent ETFs. By 
these measures, with the higher Sharpe ratios produced, these strategies can prove to be 
useful for investors that are looking to capture more efficient risk-adjusted performance 
relative to these inspected ETFs, at least. 
 
 
5.3. Evaluation of the fundamental weighting 
 
In this final section of the empirical results, the usefulness of the fundamental proxy 
introduced earlier is evaluated. The motivation behind the fundamental weighting is to 
use a simple proxy for discretionary fundamental analysis for the low beta-to-ETF 
strategy. As Lynch et al. (2019) discussed, the low beta-to-ETF strategy could be 
enhanced with discretionary stock picking during the ETF selloffs. However, testing 
systematic trading strategies with combined discretionary analysis would provide 
dishonest results due to severe look-ahead bias. Thus, using a fundamental proxy of 
Piotroski F-Score by Piotroski (2000) is suggested in this paper. In the next table, the 
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results from the 1-40 day CAARs is presented for the low beta-to-ETF strategy with F-
score portfolio weightings: 
         
FUNDAMENTAL WEIGHTING 
Days after volume spike t 
  t+5 t+10 t+20 t+40 
          
IVV -0.003 -0.006 -0.011 0.001 
  (0.54) (0.15) (0.47) (0.68) 
QUAL -0.001 0.006 -0.004 0.006 
  (0.99) (0.15) (0.23) (0.16) 
ISF -0.002 0.002 0.006 0.022** 
  (0.41) (0.89) (0.18) (0.02) 
EXS1 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.004 
  (0.75) (0.97) (0.93) (0.67) 
SXRT 0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.009 
  (0.71) (0.76) (0.62) (0.29) 
SUAS 0.013** 0.015** 0.019*** 0.026** 
  (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
IESG 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.015 
  (0.36) (0.38) (0.27) (0.12) 
IH2O -0.005 -0.012 -0.003 0.000 
  (0.41) (0.21) (0.34) (0.27) 
Notes: This table presents the CAARs for each selected ETF by the periods of t+5, t+10, t+20 and t+40, t being 
the abnormal ETF volume event. The ETF-beta estimation period starts from 01/2015 and the full sample 
consists of 01/2016 - 08/2020. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicates significance levels of 0.05 (**) and 0.01 
(***). Please see table 1 for ETF symbol explanations. 
 
Table 12. Cumulative average abnormal returns for outsider portfolios created after ETF selloff day, 
Fundamental weighted. 
 
Compared to the value-weighted results of the 1-40 day strategy, by weighting the selloff 
date low beta-to-ETF portfolios by the fundamental factor provides unsatisfactory results. 
Most of the 40-day CAARs decrease compared to the results in Tables 6 and 7, apart from 
IESG ETF, and the fundamental component brings no better statistical significance to the 
overall results. The only consistently positive CAAR with statistical significance is with 
the SUAS ETF, which had these same attributes with value-weighted portfolios.  
 
The other well-performing outsider portfolio with value-weighted results was the ISF 
ETF which CAARs get slightly worse and less statistically significant. As seen, results 
thus far are disappointing and do not advocate for the F-Score weighting for forming the 
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outsider portfolios. However, the statistic in Table 12 suffers from the same COVID-19 
related adversity as the 1-40 day statistics presented for the value and equal-weighted 
outsider portfolios in Tables 6 and 7. 
 
Furthermore, making a similar COVID-19 adjustment to the F-Score weighted portfolios 
increases the generated cumulative 40-day average abnormal returns, but the results still 
lack the statistical significance, prevailing in the value-weighted CAARs (Table available 
in appendix 7). This means that despite the cumulative abnormal returns on average are 
larger, there still is enough randomness in the results that stating these average positive 
abnormal returns as meaningful is not justifiable. 
 
To further contrast the F-Score weighted portfolios against the value-weighted portfolios, 
the following Graphs 15 and 16 present the CAARs of both portfolio weightings with and 






As seen in Graph 15, the value-weighted average CAARs are approximately 30 bps 








1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
Average cumulative abnormal return after ETF volume spike
Avg. CAARs (FSCORE WEIGHTED) Avg. CAARs (VALUE WEIGHTED)
Graph 15. Average CAARs after ETF selloff days, F-Score weighted against Value weighted. 
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does not change the setting, as F-score weighted average CAARs underperform the value-
weighted results by 18 bps. Graph 16 demonstrates the difference between the COVID-




To summarize the findings and assess the third hypothesis, the F-Score weighting, or the 
fundamental component, does not enhance the stock-picking ability for the low beta-to-
ETF strategy. Thus, the third hypothesis is rejected. The discretionary equity analysis 
suggested by Lynch et al. (2019) for enhanced returns is still the favored approach for 
investors looking for an added fundamental approach to the low beta-to-ETF strategy, as 















1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
Average cumulative abnormal return after ETF volume spike
Avg. CAARs (FSCORE WEIGHTED) COVID-19 Adj.
Avg. CAARs (VALUE WEIGHTED) COVID-19 Adj.
Graph 16. Average CAARs after ETF selloff days, COVID-19 adjusted  F-Score weighted against COVID-







In this paper, the Lynch et al. (2019) study inspired low beta-to-ETF systematic trading 
strategy that exploits the ETF constituent stock co-movement after ETF selloffs, is tested 
with a unique and updated sample of U.S., European and International market tracking 
broad-index and fundamental factor ETFs. This paper investigated eight different ETFs 
with a combined AUM of $266 billion. The ETFs were investigated for the sample period 
of 01/2016 to 08/2020 to provide continuity and further look for the Lynch et al. (2019) 
study. 
 
In the low beta-to-ETF strategy, stock betas are estimated against their parent ETFs and 
used to create a portfolio from the bottom 10% beta stocks. These portfolios are created 
after the trigger events of ETF selloff days, measured with increased daily ETF trading 
volume with combined negative ETF return for that day. With the value-weighted 
portfolios, the average abnormal returns produced by this strategy cumulated to 1.30% 
after 40-days. By excluding the February – March 2020 COVID-19 related events from 
the sample, the cumulative average abnormal returns further increased to 1.43% after 40-
days. 
 
Curiously, when investigating the behavior of the sample ETF constituent correlations 
during the abnormal ETF volume days in Graph 7 with the methods of Lynch et al. (2019), 
a similar pattern of heightened constituent cross-correlations could be captured for the 
broad-index funds, but not with the ESG and quality factor ETFs in the sample. These 
findings show that some constituents in these fundamentals themed funds stay largely 
uncorrelated even during abnormal volume events. This instead implies that these 
uncorrelated stocks could possess crash-risk protecting qualities during uncertain times 
(Kim et al. 2014). 
 
Additionally, this paper further tests the usability of the low beta-to-ETF strategy by 
analyzing its performance when systematically utilized in the long-term. Thus, a single 
return time series with consistent outsider portfolio creation is made for each of the ETFs 
in which excess returns are then estimated with the Fama-French 5-factor model, with the 
additional Betting Against Beta (BAB) factor. These long-term strategies fail to generate 
statistically significant alpha but overperform almost unanimously against their parent 
ETFs when measured by Sharpe ratio. Consequently, systematically utilizing the low 
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beta-to-ETF strategy can yield investors better risk-adjusted performance in contrast to 
just passively investing with ETFs, but the strategies fail to generate pure alpha when 
measured by the FF5 model. 
 
Finally, the advantages of the fundamental component to function as a proxy for 
discretionary stock analysis in the outsider portfolio creation phase are tested. The returns 
obtained with the Piotroski (2000) F-Score weighted low beta-to-ETF portfolios are 
almost without exception the same or worse than the value-weighted portfolio returns. 
This underperformance persists in the long-term analysis, and thus the Piotroski F-Score 
does not function as a useful fundamental proxy for the creation of these outsider 
portfolios and does not replace the discretionary fundamental equity analysis. 
 
Suggestions for future research are numerous. As the time-structure of the low beta-to-
ETF approach has been found to increase consistently towards the end of the holding 
period in this paper and Lynch et al. (2019) study, the starting points for the outsider 
portfolios could be lead forward and held longer after. The caveat for the longer held 
portfolios is that the clustering increases significantly, as selloff dates tend to repeat 
themselves regularly. This could be mitigated by increasing the selloff date requirement 
threshold either by demanding more than three standard deviation departure from the 
usual trading volume or adding a more significant negative return requirement for the 
high-volume days, as the return requirement was not appropriately motivated by the 
original Lynch et al. (2019) paper. Additionally, it could be analyzed whether the 
magnitude of the negative return for the selloff date impacts the profitability of the 
strategy portfolios. 
 
Moreover, as the outsider strategy in half resembles the BAB strategy by Frazzini & 
Pedersen (2014), the strategy could be converted even more towards it by taking the 
opposite position on the high beta-to-ETF stocks. Moreover, focusing the ETF sample 
solely on the largest and most liquid ETFs without regional restrictions would prove to 
be an exciting addition to further research. Finally, as the AUMs and the trading volumes  
with the ESG factor ETFs are poised to increase in the future, the methods in this thesis 
and Lynch et al. (2019) paper should be used to investigate these thematical funds more 
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Appendix 1. IVV ETF Cumulative returns 
Appendix 2. SUAS ETF Cumulative return 








IVV ETF cumulative returns 01/2016 - 08/2020









13/07/2016 13/04/2017 13/01/2018 13/10/2018 13/07/2019 13/04/2020
SUAS ETF cumulative returns 01/2016 - 08/2020







IESG ETF cumulative returns 01/2016 - 08/2020
IESG STRATEGY STRATEGY RF
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Appendix 4. QUAL ETF Cumulative returns 
 
Appendix 5. IH2O ETF Cumulative return 
 








QUAL ETF cumulative returns 01/2016 - 08/2020







SXRT ETF cumulative returns 01/2016 - 08/2020










IH2O ETF cumulative returns 01/2016 - 08/2020
IH2O STRATEGY STRATEGY RF
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Appendix 7. COVID-19 Adjusted Fundamental Weighting CAARs 
 
 
Appendix 8. Orbis F-Score variable codes 
 
PROFITABILITY EU = (IF(ROA>#0,#1,#0))+(IF(15514>#0,#1,#0))+(IF(ROA[N]>ROA[N-
1],#1,#0))+(IF((15514/TOAS)*#100>ROA,#1,#0)) 
 







EFFICIENCY = IF((GRMA[N]>GRMA[N-1]),#1,#0)+IF((NAT[N]>NAT[N-1]),#1,#0) 
t+5 t+10 t+20 t+40
IVV -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.007
(0.99) (0.50) (0.59) (0.40)
QUAL 0.002 0.008 0.008 0.015
(0.71) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07)
ISF 0.001 0.006 0.011 0.020**
(0.79) (0.71) (0.11) (0.03)
EXS1 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.009
(0.79) (0.48) (0.46) (0.35)
SXRT 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.011
(0.76) (0.38) (0.31) (0.16)
SUAS 0.008 0.012** 0.015** 0.020
(0.14) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06)
IESG -0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.018
(0.56) (0.62) (0.81) (0.17)
IH2O -0.004 -0.006 0.000 0.000
(0.92) (0.98) (0.39) (0.55)
Days after volume spike t
FUNDAMENTAL WEIGHTING
COVID-19 ADJUSTED
Notes: This table presents the CAARs for each selected ETF by the periods of t+5, t+10, t+20 and t+40, t being 
the abnormal ETF volume event. The ETF-beta estimation period starts from 01/2015 and the full sample 
consists of 01/2016 - 08/2020. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicates significance levels of 0.05 (**) and 0.01 
(***). 
Average cumulative abnormal returns for outsider portfolios after abnormal ETF volume spike
